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Abstract
This study disaggregates civil wars into three types: conventional, irregular, and symmetrical
nonconventional. Conventional and symmetrical nonconventional warfare are instances of
conflict whereby the incumbent state and the insurgent enjoy equally heavy and sophisticated
artillery

(conventional)

or

equally

light

and

rudimentary

weaponry

(symmetrical

nonconventional). Irregular civil wars are fought when the incumbent enjoys clear militaristic
superiority relative to the insurgent. This study suggests that economic grievances can expose
states to irregular civil wars, while high religious fractionalization and high ethnic
fractionalization in autocratic states can make them vulnerable to conventional and symmetrical
nonconventional civil wars, respectively. Further, across the three types of civil wars, irregular
civil wars are the deadliest for civilians. Conventional civil wars are the deadliest when it comes
to estimating the number of battle-related casualties. Finally, and regardless of the type of civil
war, a sustained increase in the wealth of nations has decisively helped states move toward
consolidation against civil war, especially since the late 1920s.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The study of civil wars possibly enjoys the longest historical legacy among studies on
instances of political violence in the field of Political Science. In fact, since the period of classical
Greece, Thucydides documented instances of what nowadays would arguably be considered
episodes of civil war. Further, it was the antagonism between the defenders of democracy and
those of oligarchy that triggered the internal war of Corcyra, which brought about the
Peloponnesian War that opposed Athens to Sparta (Thucydides 2013). That is to say that not only
have civil wars been ubiquitous in human history, but that they also have appeared to play a major
role in changing political and war dynamics throughout history.
Thus, it becomes important to explain what makes states vulnerable to civil war. The
literature on the vulnerability or exposure to civil war onset has typically taken three main
trajectories. One vein of the literature correlates civil war onset with ethnic conflict (Montalvo et
al. 2005; Cederman et. al 2009; Cederman et al. 2013; Miodownik et al. 2011; Gurses 2015).
Some have developed rational choice models to assess rebel tactics of mobilization as a function
of cost and benefit calculus (Bueno de Mesquita 2013). Others have attributed economic
opportunism to civil war onset (Collier et al. 2004). While, others have argued that the civil wars,
which erupted in the 1990’s are merely the result of protracted conflicts of the 1950’s (Fearon et
al. 2003). A relatively new vein within the literature has elaborated on the type of violence (direct
or indirect) and the form of warfare (irregular, conventional, or symmetrical nonconventional civil
wars1) when discussing civil war severity as a function of civilian and battle-related deaths
(Kalyvas 2001, 2006; Balcells 2010; Balcells et al. 2014). Thus, instead of opting for over-

1

The three categories of civil wars are defined in Section 3.1.

1

aggregation of all civil wars into one measure, those works have categorically differentiated
between the weaponry used by the warring actors2 (Balcells et al. 2014) along with the level of
control over resources (i.e. territory and citizenry) each warring actor claims to have (Kalyvas
2001, 2006) (Kalyvas et al. 2009) on a subnational level. Since several of the aforementioned
works focus exclusively on the variation in the level of violence (the casualties sustained by of
both civilians and non-civilians, or combatants), the first part of this study attempts to fill the gap
in the research by assessing the exposure (i.e. the vulnerability of a state) to civil war, while
adhering to the conceptual and empirical distinction between conventional, irregular, and
symmetrical nonconventional civil wars. To the best of my knowledge, neither the aforementioned
disaggregation nor the type of models used in systematically assessing the risk of civil war onset
have yet served to explain the risk exposure to civil war onset in the broader literature.
The second part of this study assesses the level of violence unique to civil wars. There are
no civil wars without civilian casualties. While seemingly trivial at face value, this statement helps
to legitimately put into perspective the violence perpetrated against civilians over the course of a
civil war. In the words of Hannah Arendt, “it [violence] is a phenomenon in its own right” (as cited
in Kalyvas 2006: 20). The level of violence is disaggregated into two scopes of analysis: first is a
macro-level analysis before assessing the variation in the level of violence on the micro-level in
order to identify a fundamental difference (if any) in the patterns of violence when considering
both levels, separately. Moreover, another distinction is made between the victims who succumb
during civil wars. The level of violence first conflates civilian and combatant casualties (i.e. battlerelated deaths), before isolating combatants in order to exclusively focus on civilian deaths (deaths
occurring outside the battlefield). This disaggregation will help distinguish a pattern of violence

Throughout this paper, the phrase ‘warring actors’ will always refer to both the incumbent state and the insurgent,
in a context of civil war.
2

2

unique to a type of civil war while also assessing which type of civil war is more lethal. Thus, the
differential in the level of violence becomes a function of the type of civil war being fought.
The disaggregation into the dyads macro/micro-level, civilian/combatant casualties, and
the triad conventional/irregular/symmetrical nonconventional civil wars should improve the
visibility of the dynamics of civil war. In turn, this improved visibility should be amenable to
identifying the level of violence, its scope, and the perpetrator(s) of that violence. Consequently,
these newfound insights should help the academic community gain an analytical leverage over the
ubiquitous phenomenon that is civil war, while allowing the policy community to develop
measures in the hopes of encouraging compromise between the two warring actors, in order to put
an end to a given civil war of which civilians typically pay the price. This study, given its focus
(albeit not exclusive) on micro-level variation in the level of violence perpetrated against civilians,
should also be amenable to policy formation when implementing and developing sustainable,
credible, and fair trials of accountability for war-crimes once a civil war comes to an end.
Finally, the third section assesses the extent to which states consolidate against the risk
exposure to civil war. Here civil war types are all conflated together as the variation between
consolidating and failing to consolidate against all types of civil war is deemed more valuable than
that between consolidating and failing to consolidate against a specific type of civil war. The
results of this section are based on a unique statistical model, which, unlike the models presented
in the existing literature, is centered on a change-point model analysis derived from Bayesian
computation. The results suggest that wealthy states decisively began moving toward
consolidation against civil war in the early 1930s. Also, while non-democratic states fail to
consolidate against civil wars, especially since the 1960s, states with a higher democratic
propensity are still far from being immune to civil wars, especially since the early 1940s. These

3

findings indicate that the difference between civil war onset and not experiencing civil war is one
of wealth and state maturity, and not one of democratic quality. The wider implication puts into
perspective the notion (albeit essentialist in a sense) that some states may not be ripe to consolidate
decisively against the risk exposure to civil war, and that time, along with consolidated economic
prosperity, can propel them into ‘safety’.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter Two provides a brief summation
of the existing literature on both the causes and the level of violence in civil wars, while the limited
works on the consolidation of states against civil wars will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
Chapter Three lays out the theoretical foundation upon which this paper is built. Chapter Four
discusses the data and the methodology that relate to the risk exposure to civil war onset and
estimates the statistical models relevant to the specified relationships. Chapter Five discusses the
data and the methodology used to generate the results on the variation in the level of violence in
civil wars and estimates the statistical models relevant to the specified relationships. Chapter Six
elaborates on the consolidation literature and discusses the data, methods and statistical results
relevant to a state’s ability to consolidate against civil war. Chapter Seven features an overarching
summation of the work, which includes a discussion of the study’s limitations as well as areas for
future research.

4

Chapter 2:
Literature Review
This section divides the literature into two sections. The first will go over the literature that
discusses the risk exposure to civil war onset and the second will expand on the literature that
assesses the level of violence unique to civil wars. Given the dearth of literature on what makes
states consolidate against the risk exposure to civil wars, the argument of consolidation against
civil wars is outlined and explained in detail in Chapter Six (Consolidation Against Civil War).
2.1. What Makes States Vulnerable to Civil War?
There are multiple answers to the above question. The abundance of answers is largely due
to three factors. First, some say that the coding of civil war onset has grown increasingly
ambiguous (Sambanis 2004). When discussing the coding of civil war onset, two main
“contending” works are the Correlates of War Dataset (or COW) (Sarkees et al. 2010) and the
Armed Conflict Dataset (or UCDP/PRIO) (Gleditsch 2002; Petterson & Wallensteen 2015). The
main distinction between these datasets lies in the substantively different threshold of deaths upon
which civil war onset can be coded. In fact, while the COW dataset codes a civil war onset as
corresponding to a minimum of 1000 yearly thresholds, the PRIO dataset registers instances of
civil wars whenever the number of battle-related deaths reaches at least 25 in a year3.
There also seems to be a strong divide within the literature as to the type of variables that
can aptly explain the onset of a civil war (Dixon 2009). Authors such as Collier et al. (1998) argue
that civil war onset, through the mobilization of the rebels, is strongly conditioned by initial

3

Note that the section on the exposure to civil war utilizes the COW parameter of civil war while the one on the
violence of civil war considers the definition of civil war that PRIO provides. The reason is explained in the research
design section.
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income, or per capita GDP that the population enjoys4. Their findings suggest that civil wars, when
fought, are symptomatic of material or more precisely economic grievances (Collier et al. 1998).
Another contending body of literature has focused on the impact of ethnicity on the
likelihood of civil wars, which is also fraught with competing explanations. In fact, while Fearon
et al. (2003) 5 suggest that ethnic diversity fails to predict civil war onset, Lane (2016) suggests
that not only can ethnic divisions beget civil wars, but that the ethnic mobilization within a given
state spatially spreads within and outside the state experiencing conflict. Moving away from the
ethno-geographical dynamic of civil war onset, Cederman et al. (2013) posits that ethnic civil wars
are much more likely to materialize after the second election cycle in a state on a democratizing
trajectory (that has only recently implemented elections). In the work of Cederman et al. (2013),
the most decisive results relate to the impact of ethnic group exclusion6 on the probability that an
ethnic civil war will erupt. Those results are significant at the .01 level and are robust to the
inclusion of multiple variables, namely whether the newly implemented elections were
competitive and the number of elections. However, one has to be mindful of the dichotomy of
ethnic versus non-ethnic civil wars. In fact, while the work of Cederman et al. (2013), among
others, makes the distinction between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars, it fails to explain why
certain factors are better at explaining ethnic civil war onset while failing to provide an element of
explanation to the occurrence of non-ethnic civil wars. This is largely due to a failure in theorizing

4

Adhering to a similar rational choice approach-as the one in the work of Collier et al. (1998)- more recent works
have explained the likelihood of conflict through the mobilization of rebels and their subsequent chances of launching
consolidated insurgencies through well-thought out rebel tactics (Buneo de Mesquita 2013).
5
Their main thesis is that current civil wars are merely a prolongation of protracted conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s
(Fearon et al. 2003).
6
By group exclusion, the authors allude to the notion that politicians in democratizing states tend to run their electoral
platform on narrow and ad hoc ethnic cohorts, which ipso facto favors some ethnic groups while excluding others.
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that reflects the complexity and the fundamental difference between ethnic grievances and
grievances that are ethnically agnostic7.
Note that throughout this thesis, ethnicity, albeit controlled for, is not the center of analysis
to either the risk exposure to civil war onset or to civil war violence. This is mainly because this
study focuses on which variables contribute to the onset of specific types of civil war. The
parameter of the type of civil war, throughout the study, corresponds to the mode of fighting the
civil war. In other words, this work avoids answering the question of why civil wars are fought,
but instead attempts to provide an element of an answer to the question of how civil wars are
fought. Additionally, this paper also attempts to discern which variables make states most
vulnerable to which type of civil war.
It should be noted however, that while there seems to be contention within the literature on
civil war causes, there is strong agreement or at least consensus on the notion that wealthier states
seem to consolidate against the risk exposure to civil war (Dixon 2009)8. Dixon (2009) conducts
a meta-analysis of quantitative research on civil war, and deduces that a total of nine quantitative
works, which looked at civil war onsets, found a negatively substantial and significant effect (at
the .01 level) of per capita GDP on civil war onset; an additional six works found a similar
relationship at the .05 level (Dixon 2009). Also, out of a total of 45 quantitative works that
accounted for the effect of per capita GDP on civil war onset9, only one work found a positive
relationship between per capita GDP and civil war onset.

7

See Sambanis (2001) for exceptions.
See Dixon (2009) for an interesting and exhaustive overview of a substantial part of the quantitative literature on the
risk exposure to civil war onset since the 1990s.
9
This is including various types of per capita GDP; such as lagged one year per capita GDP, or logged versus not
logged, etcetera.
8
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2.2. How is Civil War Violence Defined? And How Can it be Measured?
Civil war violence has generally been conceived of as a completely irrational and “chaotic”
phenomenon (Dufort 2014: 207): words such as ‘senselessness anarchy’ (Kaplan 1994) [as cited
in Cramer (2002)], ‘incomprehensible’, ‘wanton’ (Ganley 1997) [as cited in Kalyvas 1999], or
even ‘pure folly’ (Tuchman 1984) may hinder the complexity behind the phenomenon of violence
and reduce the occurrence of violence to simple episodes of passion taking over reason. This paper
is based on the premise (or the assumption) that the violence in civil wars is actually motivated by
tactical moves at the disposal of the warring actors10. This is not to say that ad-hoc violence isn’t
relevant to winning the war, but that both the incumbent state and the main insurgent challenger
will typically have to carry out a strategy whereby at least a minimal level of intentional lethal
violence against civilians is committed in order to have a chance at winning the war (Arjona et al.
2015).
When it comes to the quantitative study of civil war violence, the researcher has typically
been given the choice between two types of disaggregation. The first disaggregation relates to
whether to focus on the variation in the level of violence at a macro or at a micro-level11. In this
study, the variation in the level of violence is analyzed both on a macro and micro-level
(separately). Essentially, violence that occurs at a macro-level is one where the aggregate number
of deaths is reported per year and at a state or national level. On the other hand, micro-level
violence usually records deaths per time period (daily, weekly, monthly, and so forth) and typically
assesses the level of violence at a municipal level, or sub-nationally in general. The second
disaggregation aims at distinguishing between combatant and noncombatant (or civilian)

10

After all, one cannot possibly expect to find significant results if the outcome one is studying never behaves
according to some type of systemic pattern or never adheres to some type of coherent variation over time.
11
The reason for focusing on both levels of analysis is amply explained in the research design section.
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casualties over the course of a civil war. This research first aggregates civilian and combatant
casualties, before isolating instances of violence perpetrated exclusively against civilians12. Other
works have taken a similar approach when analyzing civil war violence (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas
et al. 2009; Balcells 2010; Balcells et al. 2014). Thus, a first observation to make is that both
combatant and civilian deaths, considered together or separately, typically gauge the level of
overall violence in a given civil war. In other words, the higher the number of combatant and
civilian deaths, the more lethal (and thereby violent) a given civil war.
There are different parameters to consider when analyzing the level of violence. Some have
considered territorial control (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas et al. 2009), others the geographic pattern
of violence diffusion or relocation; however, both are a function of the intensity of violence
(Gulden 2002; Schutte and Weidmann 2011). Kalyvas (2006)13 generates a typology of control
zones. Kalyvas (2006) defines control zones as a function of the extent to which a population has
access to either the incumbent or the insurgent. This work posits that control zones can be derived
from a continuum compiling a total of five zones. Control zone 1 represents total control of the
incumbent when it has successfully “destroyed most or all insurgent clandestine cells and are able
to prevent the rebels from entering or operating with any effectiveness” (Kalyvas 2006). The
reciprocal opposite of this scenario where the insurgent exercises full control characterizes control
zone 5. Control zone 2 represents a zone where the incumbent exercises “secure but incomplete
control” (Kalyvas 2006). Insurgents can still enter this zone in a sporadic fashion, “mainly at
nights” (Kalyvas 2006). The reciprocal opposite is control zone 4 only in favor of the insurgent.
Finally, control zone 3 is of quasi-equal incumbent and insurgent control. Kalyvas posits that this

12

The reason is also explained in the research design section.
The work of Kalyvas (2006), The Logic of Violence in Civil War, for which he won the Woodrow Wilson Foundation
Award, is a remarkable micro-level study of the Greek civil war (1943-49), which combines rigorous qualitative and
quantitative designs.
13
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zone (zone 3) experiences the least violence (Kalyvas 2006). This spatial typology of control at
the disposal of either warring actor directly reflects the direction and magnitude of violence
perpetrated against civilians. Kalyvas (2006) muses that the most lethal control zones are 2 and 4,
whereby the incumbent and the insurgent enjoy secure but incomplete control over the population,
respectively. Below is a graphical visualization of this scenario14.
Figure 2.3 Predicted Levels of Selective Violence as a function of Territorial Control

Source: Compiled by Kalyvas 2006; See The Logic of Violence, p. 132.

Other scholars have more recently moved away from analyzing how the shifts in territorial
control produce a variation in the level of violence in order to assess the extent to which elections,
thus political ideology more broadly, influences the magnitude of violence perpetrated against
civilians during civil war. In fact, the work of Balcells (2010) designs a micro-level dataset
introducing 1062 municipal-level observations in the region of Catalonia during the Spanish civil
war (1936-39), and finds that civil war violence against civilians substantially increases whenever

14

See Kalyvas et al. 2009 The Dynamics of Violence in Vietnam: An Analysis of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)
for a micro-level quantitative application of the above theory on another case of civil war.
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pre-war political competition between parties reaches parity (or a close margin of victory), at the
municipal level (Balcells 2010).
In conclusion, while some of the literature has discussed the causes of civil war onset, this
study instead assesses the extent to which states are exposed to civil war15. While one
disaggregation in the literature on civil war distinguishes between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars,
this work will instead distinguish between the mode of fighting peculiar to each type of civil war:
conventional, irregular, and symmetrical nonconventional. While contention as to the main drivers
of civil wars is present in the literature, there is consensus on the notion that states with high per
capita GDP resist civil wars (Dixon 2009). While the literature on civil war has considered ethnic
and religious fractionalization as time-invariant, the design of those variables in the first part of
this study generates variation from one observation to the next. There also exists a consensus in
the literature on civil war violence as far as the notion that violence can be operationalized by
accounting for combatant and civilian deaths over the course of a civil war. While the literature on
civil war violence has more than often assessed the macro-level variation in violence over the
course of civil wars, this study distinguishes between macro and micro-level variations. This
research also focuses on both combatant and civilian deaths before exclusively focusing on civilian
deaths in order to identify a unique and clear pattern in both types of violence.

15

In fact, discussing causation implies a full impact of a covariate on civil war onset. On the other hand, assessing the
exposure to civil war presupposes varying degrees of exposure and vulnerability to civil war. We find the latter concept
more fitting than the former when studying civil wars, as it is hard to establish pure causality between such a complex
phenomenon that is civil war and a few covariates.
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Chapter 3:
Theoretical Framework
This chapter provides the framework for the entire study and discusses the theories of the
types of civil wars, its causes, contributors and mitigating factors, as well as how states may
consolidate or protect themselves from the occurrence of civil wars. This chapter is organized into
four main sections.
3.1. Ideal Types of Civil Wars
This work uses the definition of civil war offered in the work of Kalyvas (2006): a civil
war is defined as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between
parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities.” This definition seems to
generate parsimony and clarity regarding what civil wars constitute (Kalyvas 2006: 5; 17).
Also, this work conceives of civil wars as a disaggregation into three ideal types:
conventional, irregular, and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars. The aforementioned
terminology of conventional, irregular and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars is borrowed
from the work of Balcells et al. (2014). In this study, the type of civil war becomes a function of
the military power each actor—rebels relative to incumbents—have at their disposal. The authors
develop a framework whereby conventional and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars
showcase parity in rebel and incumbent military power, while irregular warfare is fought only
when the incumbent enjoys clear military supremacy over the rebels. Also, while conventional
warfare implies the use of sophisticated weaponry on both sides, irregular warfare is fought only
when the incumbent enjoys militaristic superiority over rebel forces (in terms of technological
advancement). Finally, symmetrical nonconventional warfare presents a platform whereby both
the incumbent and rebels enjoy equally weak and rudimentary weaponry (Balcells et al. 2014).
The case of the Liberian civil war (1989-96) illustrates the conjuncture of symmetrical
12

nonconventional warfare while the cases of Libya (2011) and the ongoing war in Afghanistan are
examples of conventional and irregular warfare, respectively (Balcells et al. 2014).
One can generalize this framework to many different cases of civil wars. In fact, the
ongoing case of the Syrian civil war can arguably be categorized as a conventional civil war,
whereby rebel forces such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), being militarily and logistically backed
by foreign regional and international powers (at least between 2012 and 2013), can potentially
match incumbent military power. The case of the Greek civil war (1943-46) arguably embodies
irregular warfare, with the occupying powers of Italy and Germany enjoying greater incumbent
military power relative to communist rebels. The latter case is especially relevant in the region of
Argolid, or in Eastern coastal Greece (Kalyvas, 2006). Finally, given the light weaponry that both
the incumbent and the mainly Hutu militias (playing the role of rebels) had at their disposal, the
Burundi civil war (1992-2005) becomes arguably compatible with symmetrical nonconventional
warfare.
The aforementioned distinction between conventional, irregular, and symmetrical
nonconventional warfare is pertinent for two main reasons. First, this distinction allows for an
expansion of theories on civil wars across time and space. Further, as mentioned above, the three
categories of civil war have been successfully operationalized in three different empirical cases,
during three distinct epochs and on three different continents. The second reason this framework
is useful to this study, but also to future works on civil war, is on how the focus on the
aforementioned nomenclature relates to the notion of remaining subjectively uninvolved in the
phenomenon in question. In other words, this distinction made between types of civil wars can
help explain the dynamics of war within a state regardless of demographic or societal variables
such as ethnic salience that more than often, in the literature, substitutes for the actual examination
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of war dynamics in instances of civil wars. Consequently, one ends up studying ethnic or religious
salience and its exogenous impact on civil war onset. The distinction between civil war types
should help to explain war dynamics that are endogenous to the civil war phenomenon itself, thus
reducing measurement error, inter alia, by gaining in accuracy and precision when evaluating the
risk exposure to civil war. Consequently, predicting and analyzing civil war onset through this
distinction between types of civil wars should help the research and policy community gain an
analytical leverage over a complex phenomenon that cannot be fully explained by variables (such
as ethnic salience) inherently exogenous to the conflict itself.
3.2. Exposure to Civil War
In this section, the determinants that can potentially explain variation in the type of civil
war and subsequently analyzing the risk exposure to civil war undergo a disaggregation into three
different types of variables: political, economic, and demographic. Two main political variables
should explain variation in the risk exposure to a specific type of civil war. The first is whether the
incumbent has consolidated his/her regime and seized power unconstitutionally. This variable
should reflect episodes of democratic breakdown, or at least fragilization, as a result of incumbent
takeover16. Typically, such cases are preceded by a consolidated increase in democracy scores.
One can think of the case of Peru, which saw the rise in its democracy scores (for 12 uninterrupted
years) before the takeover of Fujimori in 1992. The second political variable to be introduced is
whether the executive is independent from or subjugated to the military.
The theory here is straightforward: it is argued that political variation, gauged by the three
aforementioned variables, should be more susceptible to the outbreak of conventional civil wars
while failing to explain the exposure of states to both irregular and symmetrical nonconventional
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Note that the variables democratic propensity and incumbent consolidation correlate perfectly with each other three
percent of the time.
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civil wars. Contestation of power within, among and outside of political parties have typically
crystalized the antagonism that stretches from the political ideology endorsed by the extreme left
to the extreme right, without forgetting less radical ideologies of left, center of left, center of right,
and right. Whenever a given polity is democratic, or whenever the political expression of citizens
and that of emerging political parties have a fair chance at influencing political outcomes, political
disputes are resolved peacefully, and typically through the ballot box. This is relevant for both
liberal and radical democracies, whereby the protection of private property and that of minority
groups constitute the democratic ideal in the former example of democracy while majority rule
facilitated by constituent assemblies and supported by plebiscitary structures of direct voting
champion the ideal of the latter (Ellner 2012).

Whenever political expression is limited,

contestation becomes more likely to be met with violent repression by the incumbent state. One of
three things can follow: the current incumbent state can survive by ignoring civilian demands while
relying on a highly capable military to subdue civilian protests—the aforementioned resembles
what happened in Bahrain in 2011. Bahrainis that took to the streets (peacefully) asking for more
political representation were violently crushed first by Bahraini authorities and then by Saudi
security forces. The second scenario is that the incumbent can be toppled as result of a radical and
powerful social uprising that has decisively consolidated and has in a sense stripped the incumbent
government from any form of political legitimacy. This was the case of Egypt in 2011, which saw
the demise of Mubarak’s regime, who had served close to a forty-year mandate. Finally, a civil
war can arise as a result of the resistance of the incumbent state and a high (at first) civilian
propensity to oppose this resistance. Such was the case of Syria in 2011. In fact, after what had
been recognized as a peaceful protest in Dera’a (a Southern rural Syrian locality), the 4 th armed
division (incumbent death squad) retaliated by successfully clearing the protest. That same day,
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dismantled after incumbent intervention, a few civilians burned down the headquarters of Al
Ba’ath (the incumbent) leading to a spree of arrests and a degeneration into the firing of live
ammunition by the incumbent that lead to the deaths of fifteen civilians after a two-day assault
(Holliday 2013). Following that protest in Dera’a, a nationwide anti-governmental protest began
on March 25th to address popular grievances (Holliday 2013); which eventually propelled a
majority of Syrian localities (mainly rural at first) into a situation of civil war 17. While the war in
Syria has not been fought on political grounds one can argue, it still represents a civil war with
political origins whereby civilian demand for more freedom of expression was the root cause for
regime contestation. Therefore, it is argued that conventional civil wars, unlike irregular and
symmetrical nonconventional civil wars, are more likely to occur whenever political freedom is at
the forefront of popular grievances.
In contrast to conventional civil wars, the theory presented in this study suggests that
economic grievances are more likely to contribute to civil wars of an irregular nature. The
explanation is straightforward: irregular civil wars imply an asymmetry in military power between
the incumbent state and the insurgent. The incumbent can use heavy weaponry such as canons or
deploy airstrikes while the insurgents hide and rely on surprise attacks while equipped with less
lethal weaponry (Kalyvas 2006). Since those wars militarily favor incumbents, by nature, the
insurgents find civilian collaboration, or at least compliance with the rules they attempt to impose
in localities over which they control, crucial for their survival. Thus, it is argued here that economic
variables can serve the insurgents if the state is in a recession (negative yearly change in GDP
growth) or if the wealth of the civilians is deteriorating (negative yearly change in per capita GDP).
The former economic variable gauges the extent to which the economy creates (or diminishes)
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Although coding procedures do not generally code March 2011 as the start of the Syrian civil war, this month
undeniably catalyzed the start of the war.
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employment opportunities18: it is argued that economic recession begets unemployment, which
ipso facto facilitates the recruitment of rebels and the consolidation of the insurgency. Likewise,
deteriorating per capita GDP can encourage civilians to join the insurgency as the opportunity cost
of not joining is mechanically reduced while not joining the insurgency can also mean that the
status quo, or deteriorating living standards, is likely to remain the same, which is a situation any
civilian would rationally want to avoid. Therefore, decreasing standards of living, exacerbated by
an economic recession, should make joining the insurgency more appealing to the civilian
population.
Finally, the third component of the theory, which addresses the exposure to civil war, posits
that demographic variables, namely ethnic and religious fractionalization, should explain an
increase (or decrease) in the exposure to the risk of civil war of a symmetrical nonconventional
nature. Ethnic and religious fractionalization, always coded as time-invariant in the literature
(Fearon et al. 2003; Eichengreen et al. 2008; Svolik 2015), cannot produce civil wars. Although
seemingly trivial at face value, this observation must be made, as it is important to denounce an
epistemological fallacy when observed: a constant, or a time-invariant variable such as ethnic or
religious fractionalization, cannot, by nature, generate variation in the dependent variable, or in
this case civil war onset. That is why this study posits that higher ethnic and religious
fractionalization scores only expose states to civil wars when the state is increasingly autocratic19.
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Unfortunately, it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to find reliable and complete data on unemployment rates in
a world sample between 1946 and 2008. Thus, economic recessions should proxy for unemployment. Note that GDP
growth is a blunt proxy for unemployment, especially if one does not have data on hiring in public versus the private
sector, as the private sector might be thriving, even at times of economic recessions. Economic recession (or
decreasing GDP growth rates) is also argued to have an impact that is consistent with civil war risk. Thus, it is assumed
here that economic recessions do not have a delayed or lagged effect on structural unemployment, which is hard to
defend. Nonetheless, GDP growth can arguably be considered the optimal proxy for unemployment.
19
This design of both ethnic and religious fractionalization indices allows for variation in those variable. Thus, as we
will see in chapter three, both ethnic and religious fractionalization indices are not time-invariant, unlike what is more
than often the case in the literature.
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Also, persuasive religious and ethnic rhetoric appears to be more prevalent during civil wars that
are fought using light weaponry (Balcells et al. 2014).
To reiterate, the theory proposes that conventional civil wars are most susceptible to
political grievances, while irregular civil wars are motivated by deteriorating standards of living,
and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars are more likely in autocratic states with higher ethnic
and religious fractionalization indices.
3.3. The Logic of Violence in Civil War
This section explores the dynamics of violence inherent to civil wars. Before theorizing the
patterns of violence associated with each type of civil war, a few key parameters of violence
deserve explicit attention. The number of battle-related noncombatant (i.e. civilians) and
combatant casualties gauges the level of violence in a given case of civil war, regardless of its
type. However, one might argue that recording the deaths of military units might not be indicative
of the violence that is endogenous to civil wars. In fact, the violence perpetrated against combatants
can also gauge violence in regular, or interstate wars, thus not necessarily capturing the intensity
indicative of civil war violence. That is why this study disaggregates civil war violence into two
categories. The first looks at both civilians and non-civilians (or combatants) fatalities during civil
war. The second isolates combatants and strictly analyzes the number of civilian deaths as a result
of civil war. Also, there is no hierarchization of violence in this paper: in other words, there is no
disaggregation of different types of violence that lead to the “absolute violence” (Sofsky 1998), or
death; in this sense, violence materializes whenever death occurs. Simply put, kidnapping, torture,
extortion, mutilation (to name a few), while being ubiquitous and almost intrinsic to civil wars
(Kalyvas 2006), are not disaggregated into further levels or strata of violence. Thus, violence is
less a process than it is an outcome. Also, ethnic violence, while also being widely propagated
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across a myriad of civil wars (Lacina 2006; Lilja et al. 2011; Di Salvatore 2016), is not the center
of analysis in examining differential patterns of civil war violence20.
One crucial reason to focus on civilian deaths (by distinguishing between combatant and
civilian casualties) is that the violence committed against civilians during a civil war more than
often becomes a set of tactics available to both the incumbent state and the insurgent. In fact,
Kalyvas (2006) argues that civil war violence is a method used to influence civilian collaboration
with either the incumbent or the insurgents depending upon the territorial control sought by either
the incumbent or the rebels, or both. In other words, inflicting continuous violence upon civilians
can be a way for a warring actor (whether the incumbent state or insurgent) to force civilians to
choose a side, or deter the same civilians from joining the insurgency (or counterinsurgency). Thus,
the use of violence can change (directly) the dynamics of the violence associated with the civil war
itself, while it can also change (indirectly) the dynamics of the civil war outcome, which typically
makes a clear winner emerge.
Looking back at the typology of civil wars discussed in Section 3.1, the level of civil war
violence becomes a function of the type of civil war. Conventional civil wars are fought when
heavy militaristic power used by the insurgent matches that of the incumbent state. Thus, at power
parity, the implication for the use of violence can be said to resemble a “winner take all” logic,
whereby winning the war is determined by the maximization of the propensity for violence on the
battlefield. Thus, the function of violence of the incumbent intersects with that of the rebels at one
point, if and only if, 𝜋𝑡𝑖 = 𝜋𝑡𝑟 ~0.5, where the probability of the incumbent winning the war at time
t becomes equal to that of the probability of the rebels winning the war at the same time t, which
should approximate an even chance. The random (winner) outcome itself generates a considerable
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That being said, ethnic fractionalization indices are accounted for in this study. Thus, ethnic violence becomes an
offshoot (if any) of overall violence.
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increase in violence on the battlefield namely because of the uncertainty in predicting a clear
winner. Consequently, the theory regarding violence unique to conventional civil wars remains
highly concentrated on the battlefield. Thus, the violence in those wars perpetrated against civilians
decreases as both incumbents and insurgents devote their resources strictly to military survival 21.
Likewise, this framework equally applies to symmetrical nonconventional civil wars. It is
argued here, however, that given the weak and light weaponry at the disposal of both incumbents
and rebels in symmetrical nonconventional civil wars, the level of violence can be assumed to be
(during the entirety of the conflict) lower than in conventional civil wars. One can conceive of this
difference between aggregate levels of violence between conventional and symmetrical
nonconventional as a variation in degrees of violence, and not an overall downward shift in the
function of violence.
Finally, when it comes to irregular civil wars, the function of violence representing the
behavior of both incumbents and rebels can be modeled as follows: 𝜋𝑡𝑖 > 𝜋𝑡𝑟 whereby the
probability of the incumbent winning the war at time t is greater than that of the rebels winning
the war at the same time t. This framework encourages the insurgent to coerce the civilian
population, as it cannot afford to directly confront the incumbent state. Thus, irregular civil wars,
while projected to cause fewer deaths on the battlefield, should be deadlier for civilians. Also, in
irregular civil wars, the incumbents can typically identify which regions (or even neighborhoods)
are sympathetic with the causes championed by the insurgents. Therefore, tactics, other than direct
incumbent violence against civilians, are available: such tactics can range from besieging rebelcontrolled areas, differentially providing basic public goods such as electricity to pro-incumbent
areas while depriving pro-rebel areas of such goods (De Juan et al. 2015), starvation methods can
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One can argue that the violence, given the framework of an all winner-logic, is highest on the battlefield when the
civil war is fought conventionally, and not in civilian-inhabited areas.
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also be used with more ease by the incumbent as it is assumed that the latter enjoys quality
information to track down the rebel presence via a set of consolidated counterinsurgency tactics.
It should be noted; however, that the aforementioned tactics are considered indirect forms of
violence, unlike the act of killing itself. Nonetheless, such tactics undeniably contribute to the
overall rise of direct violence against civilians and are theorized to be more prevalent in irregular
civil wars than in the other two types of civil war.
The literature, to a great extent, has overlooked those tactics in the study of civil wars. One
can argue that the aforementioned tactics are endogenous to civil wars, thus vital to account for
whenever violence is the key parameter of study in a given civil war. The focus on the type of
violence perpetrated against civilians during civil wars should provide elements of answer to a
broader study of civil wars, namely the quality, durability, and sustainability of both incumbent
and insurgent governance, which more than often relies on (at least) a minimal level of intentional
violence committed against civilians (Arjona et al. 2015). To fill this gap in the literature, the type
of weaponry used and the tactics that are available to both the incumbent state and the insurgent
are at the core of the coding of the type of civil war22.
To reiterate, the least amount of violence perpetrated directly against civilians in civil wars
are of symmetrical nonconventional nature, followed by conventional and irregular civil wars,
respectively. The least deadly mode of fighting on the battlefield is of irregular nature, followed
by symmetrical nonconventional, and conventional warfare, respectively. It is important to note
that the aforementioned theoretical expectations more or less23 resemble those stated in the work
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See Appendix B for a graphical visualization of how the type of weaponry and the tactics used by the warring actors
shape the probability that a civil war will be fought in conventional, symmetrical nonconventional, or irregular mode.
23
While the degrees of violence per type of civil war more or less match the expectations in the work of Balcells et
al. (2014), the theory on civil war violence provides a fist departure from Balcells et al. (2014).

21

of Balcells et al. (2014). Thus, this part of the overall study indirectly bases its theoretical
framework on the one developed in the aforementioned work.
Crucially, three main departures from the work of Balcells et al. (2014) deserve further
elaboration as they are purported to contribute to the greater literature on civil war violence. Firstly,
the choice of models used in the data on micro-level violence, is deemed to be more fitting to
capture the level of overall violence committed against civilians, as the statistical models are
estimated using count data, which measures the number of civilian deaths as opposed to ordinal
logit models which are found in the study of Balcells et al. (2014). Also, this study categorizes
the level of violence as the risk of succumbing to specific thresholds of violence, based on gradual
levels of intensity (a total of three levels). In other words, it is argued here that count data and the
subsequent choice of statistical models provide a more objective and practical measure of violence
as opposed to categorical outcome variables. Additionally, this work takes into account the
specific type of weaponry used, as opposed to merely categorizing the weapon as being of light or
heavy ballistic power as it is the case in the work of Balcells et al. (2014). This variation, when
linked to the type of tactics the incumbent state or the insurgent uses, as we will see in the
forthcoming analyses, should help in decisively identifying whether a civil war is conventional,
irregular, or symmetrical nonconventional. Thirdly, consistent with the tendency to direct violence
against civilians through the use of weapons, this study identifies and builds a framework of civil
war violence perpetrated against civilians by introducing twelve different tactics that are available
to both the incumbent state and the insurgent, which are arguably indicative of the underlying dayto-day practices of civil war. Those same tactics are also reflective of the power dynamic between
the two warring actors. In fact, if direct shooting is the weapon of choice deployed by both rival
actors, does that make the civil war automatically conventional? It is argued in this work that
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accounting for such tactics, which are used with specific weaponry, should decisively define the
nature of the civil war being fought when only considering the type of weaponry fails such a
demanding task. This expansion of the theory, through the three aforementioned orientations of
the theory, should pave the way for future micro-level civil war studies. This enhanced visibility
of civil war practices and the underlying war dynamics should help to define a clear dyad of
dominant versus dominated combatant over the course of a civil war and across multiple regions
at the subnational level, which as the results suggest, has strong implications for the dynamics of
civil war violence. In turn, through this theory, achieving greater visibility has three positive
externalities: first, it should help the policy community develop pertinent micro-level measures
that correspond to the empirics of each state that is at high risk for civil war onset. Moreover,
greater visibility can also identify tactics, such as besieging or starvation (among others) of the
civilian population, and in turn allow for the formulation of policy to address those practices, of
which civilians ineluctably pay the price. Finally, this greater visibility should help in identifying
the level of violence, its scope, and the perpetrator of that violence.
The theory also suggests that polities with high democratic scores that are at war should
witness an overall decrease in the level of violence as the civil war progresses, both on and off the
battlefield. Those polities, given their democratic propensity, relative to lesser democratic or nondemocratic regimes, should experience shorter civil wars. This suggestion is in opposition to less
democratic or outright undemocratic polities as those are more likely to experience protracted civil
wars24, which can explain an increase in the casualties of civilians and combatants alike. Costa
Rica, a consolidated democracy25 experienced a six-week civil war in 1948. Even though it “cost
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The duration of the civil war is not the focal point of this study, even though it is controlled for in the models. It is
only assumed that higher democratic polities will be expected to put an end to the civil war sooner than in their less
democratic or undemocratic counterparts.
25
Polity IV registers a consolidated score at +10 (the highest democratic score) for Costa Rica from 1946 to 2015.
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so many lives” (Lehoucq 1991:57), one can argue that it would have cost many more lives if the
government of 1948, “being Calderonista in inspiration” (Lehoucq 1991:57 original emphasis),
had decided to resist instead of surrendering “under terms that protect[ed] regime members from
retaliation” (Booth 2008:725). It is also theorized that an overall decrease in the level of violence
during civil wars, both on and off the battlefield, should derive from higher levels of yearly per
capita GDP and GDP growth rates. The reason is straightforward. As mentioned in Section 3.2,
per capita GDP and GDP growth rates represent (in this paper) the standards of living of
individuals and the risk exposure to unemployment, respectively. Therefore, when standards of
living are deteriorating, and when unemployment is looming, the insurgency increasingly appears
more legitimate to the civilian population and joining the insurgency becomes more likely. Thus,
it is argued that the chances of a failed insurgency, or a failure for the latter to launch sustainable
attacks against the incumbent state increase as a result of rising per capita GDP and GDP growth
rates. Consequently, the death toll of combatants and civilians should decrease overall, on and off
the battlefield. Also, given that high ethnic and/or religious fractionalization can be manipulated
by civil war brokers to mobilize incumbent sympathizers (or insurgent supporters) to fight the rival
actor; this situation should increase the overall level of violence. Evidently, in the context of civil
war, civil war brokers within states that are ethnically and religiously homogenous find it hard to
appeal to the one of the warring actors by instilling ethnic and religious divisions. Therefore, the
higher the ethnic and/or religious fractionalization of a state, within the context of civil war, the
higher the level of violence26.
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It should be noted, however, that the theory drawing on the relation between ethnic/religious fractionalization and
higher levels of violence is based on approximative expectations, as we are not aware of the extent to which civil war
potential participants find the rhetoric of ethnic and religious divisions appealing, persuasive, and for which it is worth
joining one of the warring actors.
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3.4. Consolidation Against Civil Wars
In contrast to the previous sections, this segment of the overall theoretical framework deals
with assessing the risk of civil war to which states can be exposed. While the first section of the
theory assesses the exposure to civil wars, and the second section discusses the evolution and the
differential patterns of violence during civil wars, this part of the theory estimates to what extent
states (that have or have not experienced civil wars in their recent history) have consolidated
against the risk of civil war. Also, this study evaluates the extent to which states become resistant
to civil war, which should generate a more lucid understanding of the civil war phenomenon and
help in predicting the varying risks of civil wars throughout the contemporary world.
This section builds upon three empirical configurations that derive from three distinct
premises: first, all modern states, in the Westphalian sense, are highly civil war-prone. Second,
states can transition toward stable institutions and consolidate against the risk of civil wars. Third,
states can transition toward stable institutions while failing to consolidate against the risk of civil
wars. This theory parallels the one constructed in the work of Svolik (2015) on democratic
transitions and democratic consolidation27.
Of important note is that this part of the theory does not attempt to measure the
consolidation against the risk of civil war onset directly; the latter risk is treated as a latent quality
to be inferred rather than being measured (directly). Thus, the outcome one becomes interested in
examining does not relate directly to the probability of consolidation against the exposure to the
risk of civil war, but instead examines more closely a significant decline in the probability of
relapsing into (or succumbing for the first time to) civil war. Using change-point modeling based
upon Bayesian analysis, the results should indicate a clear point in time upon which one can
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See Svolik (2015) Which Democracies Will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, and the Dynamic of Democratic
Consolidation.
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decisively assert that a given state is decisively moving toward consolidation against civil war.
Also, the logic of this part of the overall study conflates all civil war types together, as one can
argue that if a state undergoes any of the three types of civil wars, that state has thereby failed to
consolidate against the risk of civil war. In other words, any state that succumbs to any type of
civil war, no matter how brief or how ‘mild’ in severity, can be said to have actually failed to
consolidate against the risk of civil wars, in general28.
Following a path dependent approach, which posits that “once a country or region has
started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high” (Levi 1997: 27) [as cited in Pérez-Liñán
et al (2013)], politically, historically, and economically rooted patterns of development, unique to
each country (or groups of countries), should explain why some states consolidate against the risk
of civil wars while others do not. Civil wars can be conceived of as an implosion of the social
contract (as explained in section 3.1); or what Rousseau has also referred to as the social pact,
whereby equality by covenant and by right substitutes for inequalities in intelligence and strength
to the benefit of the overall communal interest (Rousseau 1968: 25). Thus, the determinants of
political, historical, and economic nature that guarantee the preservation of the social contract will
also help to support the implication that a given country has, in fact, consolidated against the risk
of civil war. Crucially, such determinants must be conceived of as distal factors when explaining
the variation in the probability of consolidation against the risk of civil wars. Focusing only on the
1946-2008 period and analyzing proximal determinants would most likely result in endorsing a
temporal bias, since civil wars are as old as the humans who fight them. Consequently, the data
goes back to the 1820s and looks at a global sample.
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The variation between not consolidating and consolidating against the risk of all types of civil wars is deemed (in
this study) to be more valuable than the one between consolidating and not consolidating against a specific type of
civil war.
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When it comes to causality, this paper theorizes that a rigorous democratic culture makes
the social contract ever more resilient, thereby making countries immune to civil wars, after
meeting a certain threshold for time passed (in years). Also, consolidated and thus uninterrupted
periods of economic prosperity or positive GDP growth rates should also help states consolidate
against the risk of civil war. Finally, a history of decisive increase in the wealth of a constituent
population in a given country, measured in yearly per capita GDP, should create a culture of wealth
that more or less applies to every individual within that country, thereby explaining a significant
increase in the probability of consolidation against the risk of civil wars; because civil wars are
costly for everyone involved, especially after a consolidated increase in general standards of living,
all parties involved would want to avoid a typical loss-loss situation as a result of a civil war.
Consequently, a culture of wealth along with one whereby economic growth is sustained should
help states consolidate against the risk of civil war.
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Chapter 4:
Exposure to Civil War
The following section represents the crux of this study and includes Chapters 4, 5 and 6,
which are essentially self-contained encompassing analyses of the three major themes of this study.
This Chapter deals with designing classical statistical models to capture those factors that explain
the rise or decline in the odds of civil war onset if the same set of experiments were to be
reproduced repeatedly over time, while Chapter 5 sheds light upon the dynamics of violence
perpetrated against noncombatants in conventional, irregular, and symmetrical nonconventional
wars, respectively. Finally, Chapter 6 evaluates the extent to which countries consolidate against
the risk of any type of civil war, that is, conventional, irregular, or symmetrical nonconventional
warfare.
4.1. Exposure to Civil War: Research Design
To explain the risk exposure to civil war onset, this study adopts a macro-comparative
design that looks at a global sample of civil war onsets from 1946 to 2008. A cross-sectional panel
sheds light on the explanatory power of covariates to increase or decrease the odds of civil war
onset. A global sample should theoretically provide the most exhaustive and the least spatially
biased sample possible; as opposed to focusing on specific individual countries or regions. The
temporal coverage associated with the population chosen covers the dynamics of cold war politics
(1946-1992), to which some have theorized a substantive change in the external military support
provided to both incumbents and rebels fighting civil wars (Kalyvas et al. 2010). The period of
1946 to 2008 also encompasses the Third Wave of Democratization (Huntington 1991), given that
some scholars have pointed to the belligerent quality of democratizing states (Rosato 2003) with
regard to waging both intra and interstate wars.
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The unit of analysis is country-years, which captures both the frequency and the intensity
of civil war occurrence. Gauging the intensity of civil wars helps to estimate to what extent civil
wars have been recurring for the same state. Each spell indicates the number of years before a
state experiences civil war. Each spell resets to one after every event failure, i.e. civil war onset.
More than a few cases have missing values across the better part of the 63 years under study, too
many of which were present, and therefore interpolating or extrapolating missing values was
impossible. Other cases were also automatically dismissed mainly because they were microstates
with populations under 500,00029.
In total, there are 275 spells, 45 of which depict conventional civil wars, 63 and 17
represent irregular and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars (respectively) that were fought
across the world from 1946 to 2008. The remaining 150 spells account for cases whereby civil
wars were not fought throughout the totality of the time period: thus, the cases of Mexico and the
United States have not undergone civil wars between 1946 and 2008. Those cases are therefore
automatically coded as right-censored observations. What follows is a clear enunciation of the
expected causal vectors that should either accelerate or delay the occurrence of civil wars. Below
are the three hypotheses suggested in this part of the study.
4.2. Exposure to Civil War: Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Incumbent consolidation, along with having the military take over
the executive, should increase the hazards associated with
conventional civil wars only.
Hypothesis 2: Higher GDP growth and per capita GDP should decrease the
hazards associated with irregular civil wars only.
Hypothesis 3: Higher ethnic and religious fractionalization indices in autocracies should
increase the hazards associated with symmetrical nonconventional civil wars only.
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4.3. Exposure to Civil War: Sources of data and operationalization of variables
a. Dependent variables
Looking at the likelihood of a civil war erupting across states between 1946 and 2008, this
part of the study utilizes the operationalization of civil war onset provided by the Correlates of
War (COW) dataset30. According to the latter, “an intra-state war must meet same definitional
requirements of all wars in that the war must involve sustained combat, involving organized armed
forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month
period” (Sarkees et al. 2010, 2). Thus, the first time period, or year, during which 1000 battlerelated deaths occur, constitutes an episode of civil war onset. While it has been argued by
Sambanis (2004) that the COW dataset comes with limitations, namely when it comes to its yearly
1000 battle-related deaths threshold that the author deems too rigid, recommending instead a
threshold of civil war onset according to a range of between 500 and 1000 yearly battle-related
deaths (Sambanis 2004). However, one can argue that the COW threshold of 1000 yearly battlerelated deaths offers an unambiguous discrete value upon whether or not a civil war takes place.
Also, one can argue that there is a wide variation between the minimal and maximal value of the
threshold suggested by Sambanis in that 500 to 1000, represents a 100% increase between the
former and the latter, which could lead one to the question the extent to which the measure
accurately captures the severity and duration of a civil war that is independent of its measurement.
In other words, one could sensibly assume that the former civil war (500 deaths) might be less
severe (in the level of violence) than a civil war with 1000 casualties, but that would be misleading
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Note that the COW dataset extends to the year 2007. Civil wars that occurred or started in 2008 were recorded using
the PRIO dataset, whenever the coding of civil war matched the coding criteria of the COW dataset (of at least a
thousand-yearly deaths). This was the case of Afghanistan (2008) that by conservatively estimates cost the lives of
4099 battle-related victims (Lacina 2009). This also was the case of Pakistan (2008) that also by conventional
estimations, is believed to have caused the deaths of at least 2996 battle-related victims (Lacina 2009). While, the war
in Sri Lanka (2008) cost the lives of at least 8396 battle-related victims (Lacina 2009). Finally, in Iraq (2008), 2090
battle-related victims succumbed during the civil war (Lacina 2009).
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in the context of the time-period; whereby a civil war with 500 deaths that occur in a single month
versus 1000 deaths that occur over the course of an entire year, can be arguably more severe in the
level of violence. Thus, setting a threshold disregards the implications associated with the varying
degrees of civil war severity and duration. Therefore, this study adheres to the parameters of civil
war as coded in the COW dataset.
The COW dataset also disaggregates civil wars into four types: those fought over a) central
control, b) local issues, c) inter-communal issues, and d) those that extend geographically to a
wider region (beyond the state itself31). The latter category is not to be conflated with ‘civil wars’
that are fought between the metropole within a colony, such as the case of Venezuela in the 1820s
(Attali 2010). This is mainly because the latter conflict was fought between Anti-Spanish
independentists on one side and Pro-Spanish forces on the other side on Venezuelan soil when
Venezuela was still not yet an independent state. Therefore, wars fought between pro-colonial
powers and independentists prior to the formal existence of an independent state do not constitute
episodes of civil war in this paper. However, wars that are fought over autonomy where the main
objective for independentists is to secede from the existing independent state while the current
government (or regime) seeks to preserve the status quo, as was the case with Sudan and South
Sudan in 2010, are coded as civil wars in this study.
Given that the models used in this part of the study rely upon competing risks analysis 32,
there are three additional dependent variables that must be mentioned. All three dependent
variables represent the three types of civil wars that a state can face: conventional, irregular, or
symmetrical nonconventional civil wars33. They are coded as 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The data is
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One can think of Yugoslavia (1991) or Ukraine (1918) as cases in point.
Explained in more detail in the methods section.
33
Defined amply in the theory section.
32
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adapted from the work of Sambanis (2004) and that of Balcells et al. (2014). Both works code civil
wars using the parameters designed by COW, whereby a 1000-yearly threshold of non-civilian
deaths constitutes the onset of a civil war, regardless of its subsequent type.
b. Independent variables
The explanatory variables capture geospatial, political, demographic, and economic
factors. The variables are divided between those that are endogenous and those exogenous to civil
war onset. One can conceive of civil war onset being subject to effects that are either exogenous
to civil wars themselves (indirectly affecting the odds of civil war), such as incumbent
consolidation, militarization of the executive, GDP growth and per capita GDP, elevation, rural
population, ethnic and religious fractionalization34; while civil war recidivism (or a state relapsing
into civil war) along with being a new state (more than often likely to be more civil war-prone than
older states) constitute variables that are endogenous to civil war onset itself. Distinguishing
between variables that are either exogenous or endogenous to civil war onset should provide a
more lucid understating of what makes states directly or indirectly exposed to civil wars.
Positing that the existence of substantial high elevation territory exposes states to civil wars
(at least directly) is more than challenging (if not impossible) to demonstrate. This is because
altitudes per state are time-invariant (or constant); and one cannot expect a constant to explain
variation in the dependent variable (civil war onset). However, from a logical and theoretical
position, elevation can explain a higher exposed risk to civil war onset because rebels tend to take
refuge in mountainous terrains (Buhaug et al. 2002; Kalyvas 2001; 2006; Holliday 2013; Bueno
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While one might argue that social or demographic variables such as ethnic or religious fractionalization might be
endogenous to civil war, we believe they can only be exogenous to civil war onset given that those same variables
might explain social uprisings, inter-state wars, or other instances of political violence that are less severe than outright
civil wars. Thus, it is more adequate to treat social or demographic variables such as ethnic and religious
fractionalization as being exogenous to the civil war phenomenon itself.
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de Mesquita 2013). The general idea behind the notion of elevation is that localities with mountains
are more likely to attract rebel infrastructure since incumbents usually have control over urban
territories and would struggle in logistic terms, to apply sufficient or effective pressure on rebel
groups hiding in mountainous terrain (Buhaug et al. 2002). In his analysis of Venezuela during the
Communist insurgency in the mid 1960’s, Gall (1965:5) describes a belief shared by the peasants:
“[they] would view themselves as facing two governments: the official one “down below” (de
abajo) in the cities, and the counter-state formed by rebel forces “up above” (de arriba) in the
hills” (Gall 1965:5) [as cited in Arjona et al. 2015:48]. Therefore, the grassroots of a guerrilla35
can potentially develop into outright civil war. Nevertheless, it would be an epistemological fallacy
to amalgamate the effects of high elevation (if any) with direct explanation of civil war onset. That
is why in this study, elevation is considered as one unavoidable geospatial variable to introduce36,
one that should gauge indirect variation in the exposed risk of civil war onset. Elevation, or rough
terrain, is measured by considering the percentage of mountainous terrain coverage per country.
These data come from Fearon et al. (2003).
Also regarding geospatial variables, the rural population is gauged by taking the difference
of the total population minus the urban population. The result is again logged in order to alleviate
the wide disparities among observations and normalize (to an extent) the distribution of data points.
The data on rural population is borrowed from the National Material Capabilities (Singer et al.
1987) compiled by the COW project37. Accounting for rural populations should have a dual
purpose: first, the literature has thus far shown there are several instances of direct opposition
between incumbents and rebels that have occurred in rural or peri-rural localities (Fearon et al.

“Guerrilla” literarily means “small war” (Clausewitz 1989).
Note that both elevation, or “Rough Terrain”, and the covariate “Rural Population” are treated as control variables
in the models.
37
The data on rural population covers the period between 1946 and 2007.
35
36

33

2003; Kalyvas 2001, 2006; Holliday 2013; Bueno de Mesquita 2013). Thus, there seems to be a
pattern whereby rural grievances are more visible or palpable than in urban localities38. Also, urban
violence, such as the case of Mexico since 2006, albeit violent (Felbab-Brown 2013), is more
indicative of a struggle between the state and criminal organizations, and not grievances between
incumbents and consolidated insurgents, which is what distinguishes urban violence from civil
wars. Second, introducing rural population as a potential explanatory variable in increasing the
hazards associated with civil war onset has a conceptual mission in distinguishing between rural
versus urban culture, whether it is a culture of politics, a culture of violence or a culture of society.
In fact, as Scott (1977) posits in his work, “there is a systematic slippage between political ideas
as understood in the city and as practiced in the village” [as cited in Kalyvas (2006)]. Thus,
accounting for the propensity of rural prevalence in each case or state helps to avoid endorsing a
type of urban bias.
When it comes to the social or demographic dimension—also exogenous to civil war onset
itself—two main variables should capture the extent to which the structure or the texture of society
can influence an increase (or decrease) in the hazards of civil war onset for symmetrical
nonconventional warfare. The first is religious fractionalization, and the second is ethnic
fractionalization. Both variables are adapted from Fearon et al. (2003); whereby the probability of
randomly selecting two individuals having different religious and ethnic affiliation generates an
ethnic and religious fractionalization distribution at the state level. This dual index of
fractionalization has been omnipresent in the studies of civil war onset (Harff et al. 2003; Haynes
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Needless to say contemporary relevant cases such as the protracted Israeli and Palestinian conflict mainly manifests
itself in urban localities (Balcells et al. 2014), however, it is argued here that there is likely to be a pattern of grievances
expressed more prevalently in rural rather than urban localities.
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2007; Cederman et al. 2013; Elaine et al. 2014). However, there are issues worth noting when the
ethnic and religious fractionalization indices are used.
First, the religious and ethnic fractionalization indices are time-invariant, thus constant per
subject throughout the survival time (63 years); therefore, the understanding that the measures are
time-invariant should mitigate any explanatory impact these two variables have on delaying or
precipitating civil war onset. Thus, given the stationary nature of these two variables, they cannot
fully account for variation in the dependent variable. That is why in this Chapter, the coding of
both ethnic and religious fractionalization is undertaken to generate variation by utilizing an
interaction between a state’s polity score39.
The existence of religious and ethnic fractionalization does not necessarily suggest
religious or ethnic tensions that would rise to the level of internal conflict. Highly fractionalized
societies, whether religiously or ethnically, such as current-day Switzerland, Canada, or the United
States mitigate the propensity for ethnic conflict given the existence of liberal democratic
institutions, which allow for minority expression of grievances. Therefore, interaction terms are
generated between ethnically and religiously fractionalized states and their respective autocratic
propensity. A Polity IV score of +10 represents a consolidated autocracy (since we inverted the
scale of Polity IV by multiplying individual scores by minus one, so that higher scores become
suggestive of an increasingly autocratic type of rule. We introduce into the models Polity IV data,
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Note that we multiply the Polity IV scores by minus 1, so that higher scores become increasingly indicative of
autocratic rule. This transformation makes viable both the theory and the methodology whereby ethnic and religious
fractionalization are expected to have an impact only when the state in question is becoming increasingly autocratic
(high positive values of Polity IV scores only in Chapter Four as Chapters Five and Six consider Polity IV data as it;
in other words higher positive Polity scores would be indicative of increasingly democratic rule- in Chapters Five and
Six).
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Ethnic Fractionalization, and Religious Fractionalization indices as the three main effects40 of the
interactive terms Polity*Ethnic Fractionalization and Polity*Religious Fractionalization.
Religious and ethnic divisions have historically been prevalent in serving as a pretext for
civil wars or political violence. One can think of the Huguenots (French Protestants or Reformists)
epitomizing violent antagonistic religious cleavages in 16th century France before they were
granted religious autonomy, but only after several violent conflicts. In the words of Keller (2008:
137): “Catholic polemicists often equated Huguenots with Muslims to imply that a new crusade
was needed to purge France of her heretics from within” (emphasis added). Also, after narrating
how the IRA (Irish Republican Army) established an alliance with pro-independentists movements
in Southern Ireland (1922), Lewis (2014) mentions how political violence oftentimes reflected
religious antagonism: “More disturbingly, on 17 June [1922], the division was responsible for a
shocking reprisal attack outside Newry. Six Protestant civilians were killed and a number of homes
burned in the attack” (Lewis 2014: 319). Thus, given their historical relevance, the inclusion of
religious and ethnic variables to potentially explain the risk exposure to civil war onset seems
warranted, but they must be contextualized within the scope of a state’s polity to have explanatory
utility.
Another political factor that is indirectly linked to civil war onset is whether or not the head
of the executive is effectively a military figure. This variable, coded as a binary, so one whenever
the aforementioned condition is met, zero otherwise, is adapted from Cheibub et al. (2010). The
variable itself should help gauge the extent to which a given state is democratically ‘deficient’ 41.

Those main effects must be accounted for in the models so that “the main effects and the interaction effects [do not]
get confounded” (Williams 2015: 1).
41
Note that the polity scores and the binary variable which codes whether the head of the executive is effectively part
of the military are only 32% correlated, thus it can be said with high confidence that the models are not distorted by
high collinearity among the two aforementioned variables.
40
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It would also suggest that the given polity, if it is headed by the military, is likely to have failed to
democratize (Karl 1990). This should be indicative of a higher exposed risk to civil war onset since
the militarization of politics can increase political opposition and foster grievances among the
constituent population.
The final political variable included in the models, assesses the extent to which politics or
the political system in place can affect civil war onset given that the incumbent has consolidated
its regime through unconstitutional means. This type of incumbent consolidation refers to the event
whereby “(1) the regime year qualifies as a democratic regime and (2) sometime during its current
tenure in office the incumbents (person, party, military hierarchy) unconstitutionally closed the
lower house of the national legislature and rewrote the rules in their favor,” (Cheibub et al.
2010:5). This variable takes a value of one whenever the aforementioned condition is met, zero
otherwise. Historically, the incumbent takeover of Alberto Fujimori, the Peruvian president that
served a dual mandate between 1990 and 2000, constitutes an episode whereby the incumbent has
consolidated under a democratic polity42 before altering the set of institutional arrangements in
his/her favor. Another case in point is the rule of the Philippines’ ex-president Ferdinand Marcos,
from 1965 to 1990 (Overholt 1986). This variable gauges how discrete events (more than often
reflecting events of incumbent takeovers) affect the probability that a given state will undergo a
civil war. The logic here is that democratic breakdown43, as a result of incumbent takeover or
constitutional manipulation by the incumbent is likely to increase the risk exposure to civil war.
Turning now to economic variables that can potentially explain the varying degrees in risk
of civil war occurrence, GDP (growth domestic product) growth per annum and per capita GDP
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Peru underwent durable military regimes prior to 1980. The year 1980 marked an uninterrupted 12 year-democratic
spell before being interrupted by Fujimori’s autogolpe in 1992.
43
Note that polity scores and incumbent consolidation correlate at 6%. Thus, it can be said with confidence that the
models are not distorted by collinearity among the aforementioned variables.
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per annum are purported to decrease the hazards of irregular civil war onset with every standard
deviation increase in each of the aforementioned variables. GDP growth gauges the wealth of
nations (Smith 1977). The logic here is that higher levels of GDP per annum translate into two
correlated posterior changes that are both inhospitable to civil war onset: first, higher GDP growth
makes any attempt at contesting the regime via civil wars counterintuitive, as higher GDP growth
is more than often synonymous with rising employment thus mitigating economic grievances 44.
Per capita GDP has been associated with state capacity. In other words, per capita GDP
and state capacity share a direct or positive relationship. Two things are worth explaining: first,
high per capita GDP implies or presupposes the notion that the state functions well in providing
basic public goods, and has cultivated both public and private investment opportunities that benefit
the majority of the populace. Note that per capita GDP takes into account the wealth distributed to
individuals45; this wealth reflects what emanates from the real economy, however. Thus, cases
such as Colombia or Peru, while having a relatively low per capita GDP 46, can, nonetheless, fail
to capture the real extent of the wealth at the individual level since a prevalent source of income
emanates from the informal economy (Felbab-Brown 2005). The second observation is that per
capita GDP represents a plausible proxy for state capacity (Lichbach 1995; Wood 2003; Fearon et
al. 2003)47, which can deter civil wars form ever manifesting because of the state’s ability to
suppress or alleviate popular grievances by opting for either extreme repression or encompassing
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This is assuming that economic redistribution to the household level is equitable and not distorted by patronage
systems. This is also not considering the extent to which the informal economy is prevalent in a given economy.
45
Although one can argue that per capita GNI (Gross National Income) may be more adequate to measure wealth than
per capita GDP. However, given the dearth of data on GNI (whether looking at the World Bank or the International
Monetary Fund Statistics), per capita GDP serves as a proxy for wealth throughout this paper.
46
Relative to the Argentinian or Brazilian economies with approximately $15000 and 11000$ per capita in the former
and the latter, respectively while Colombia and Peru were at $7800 and $6700 per capita as of 2013 (World Bank
2013).
47
Others such as Norris (2012) discuss how increasing state capacity can increase the likelihood of peace, or the
absence of conflict, but the latter focuses on a parameter of post-civil war termination, thus not looking at the exposure
to conflict ex ante.
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peaceful reforms in the case of autocracies and democracies, respectively. Crucially, it is argued
here that higher per capita GDP exacerbates collective action problems among civil war brokers.
In fact, in order for a civil war to be waged ‘properly’ and sustainably, both incumbents and rebels
(especially the latter) have to enjoy some type of legitimacy in the eyes of the population they
control or rule (Arjona et al. 2015). In the case of rising GDP growth rates, generating new
alliances, whether of a political or military nature, becomes increasingly challenging, since
individuals are likely to think twice before contesting a state from which they are directly
benefiting.
In terms of operationalization, the data on both GDP growth rates and per capita GDP come
from the Maddison project (Bolt et al.2014). GDP growth rates are measured by the yearly
percentage change (interval level data with equal intervals of one percent) in order to control for
wide disparities in dollarized nominal GDP across states, as some states are much richer than
others. Per capita GDP has a nominal base in Geary-Khamis dollars48 and is operationalized by
generating the natural log of the dollarized amounts so that standard errors decrease substantially
by normalizing the distribution of data points of per capita GDP while keeping the intensities or
degrees of wealth (on a logged scale) undistorted. Both variables, GDP growth rates and per capita
GDP, along with polity scores, incumbent consolidation, the type of executive, are all lagged by
one year in order to alleviate endogeneity in the vectors of causality. In fact it is argued that a prior
change in the aforementioned variables should increase or decrease the hazards of civil war onset,
and not the other way around; thus the rationale for lagging the variables.
Before explaining the methods used in this part of the study, it is crucial to discuss the two
variables that are conceived of as having a direct effect on civil wars: that of being a new state and
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Geary-Khamis is a hypothetical currency that helps to alleviate wide disparities in amounts of dollars by normalizing
(to an extent) differences in purchasing power across states (Bolt et al. 2014).
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civil war recidivism. Given that the median, or the most representative year, for states that achieve
sovereignty between 1816 and 2008 is 1964, a new state is measured as one that is independent
(thus for which a Polity IV score exits) post-1964. The only theoretical import that could
categorically impose a threshold upon which deciding whether a state is new becomes feasible
relates to the characterization of Pre or Post-Westphalian, which saw-the Westphalian Treaty- the
emergence of sovereign states along with the concomitant development of the concept of
diplomacy (in the 17th Century). Since in that regard, all the states under study are new or are at
least new in that they are Post-Westphalian, considering the median value as the threshold upon
which the appellation ‘new’ is granted is purported to represent the most representative value, thus
least biased, to determine whether or not a given state is new.
Utilizing the Polity IV data, which features a time-series of 1816-2008, years of no
independence or years of colonization are omitted from the sample49. Concretely, Bangladesh,
having seceded from Pakistan before gaining independence in 1971 is considered a new state50.
Crucially, new states are conceived of polities with newborn institutions, thus transitional and
unstable ones, whereby the hazards associated with civil war onset are higher than in mature states
(such as the United States or Australia). Thus, methodologically, it is vital to alleviate dependency
in the data as a result of conflating together the hazards of civil wars in mature and bourgeoning
states.
Several works have accounted for whether a state, relative to another, has relapsed into civil
war (Gurr 2000; Fearon et al. 2003; Cederman et al. 2012; Hartzell et al. 2015). Therefore, states that
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This is simply because those cases are missing from the Polity IV data, even though they would constitute instances
of civil war in this paper.
50
The wars of independence fought between European colonizers and North African independentists do not give way
to new states (in this paper) since Tunisia gained its independence in the 1950’s while 1962 marked Algerian
independence from the French. Thus, in both cases, the state is not considered new.

40

have relapsed into civil wars or those for which there is a recurrence of civil war are likely to be
more at risk of civil war than states, which have not experienced civil war since the year 190051.
Similar to that of the ‘new state variable’, civil war recidivism helps to nuance (methodologically)
the impact of explanatory variables on the hazards of civil war onset by alleviating event
dependence: survival models, by default, assign a random (or 50/50) distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity that impacts hazards in one way or another (Box-Steffensmeir et al. 2007). The idea
here is that the cases of Uganda and that of the United States are qualitatively different from one
another considering that with the former we observe a frequent occurrence of civil war, compared
to the latter where we have not observed a civil war since 1865. Therefore, we expect that Uganda
faces a higher hazard of civil war onset than the U.S. Thus, controlling for civil war recidivism is
explained by the fact that the case of Uganda may have higher hazards of civil war onset than the
United States to begin with; consequently, the introduction of civil war recidivism in order to
alleviate event dependence is warranted, both on theoretical and methodological grounds.
Finally, eight control variables are introduced, five of which are time-invariant and are
purported to capture any regional effect (four of them out of five) of civil war onset or more
precisely the type of civil war to which some regions, relative to others, may be more exposed and
also capture how elevation, or rough terrain, (the fifth and final time-invariant control variable)
can generate (to an extent) varying degrees of exposure to civil war in general and to different
types of civil war. The regions controlled for are Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, MENA (MiddleEast and North Africa), and Latin America52. The aim of controlling for region-specific effects is
twofold: first, as the work of Fearon et al. (2003) shows, most civil wars are fought in Sub-Saharan
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The year 1900 is the threshold upon which civil war recidivism is coded as 1, 0 otherwise (if it has not experienced
civil war between the year 1900 and its recorded year of entry or 1946).
52
The Latin American region includes The Dominican Republic and seventeen other Republics of Central and South
America.
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Africa, thus it is important to control for the region of Sub-Saharan Africa in order not to
overestimate hazards associated with all types of civil war. The second purpose of controlling for
region specific variation is to determine whether a specific region is more susceptible to
experiencing a specific type of civil war. Also, controlling for the MENA region helps to
investigate whether there is something unique to the types of civil wars fought in this region as
well as the propensity given that Algeria (in the 1960s and in the early 1990s), Lebanon (19751990), Jordan (1970), Libya (in 2011-), Syria (2011-), Bahrain (2011-) all experienced severe
political violence or outright civil war.
4.4. Exposure to Civil War: Methods
In this chapter we estimate a series of nonparametric models based upon survival analysis,
whereby each subject either experiences event failure (or civil war onset) during the 63 years of
observations or not (in which case it becomes automatically coded as right-censored-such was the
case of France or Austria). Using Cox Proportional Hazards estimates, this study utilizes
competing risk analyses on civil war onset. Essentially, each equation is estimated four times:
using standard Cox survival regressions, the first model conflates all types of civil wars together
in order to examine the covariate effects on hazards of civil war onset. The second model isolates
episodes of irregular and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars by treating them as censored and
competing events to the failure of the expected event, which is conventional warfare (the failure
of the expected event in the second model), thus examining the covariate effects on hazards of
conventional civil war onset53 while the hazards of irregular and symmetrical nonconventional
civil war, or more precisely their subhazards are, by design, allowed to have an impact upon the
hazards of the main failing event. Likewise, whenever the failing event of interest is irregular
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Essentially, whenever a type of civil war becomes of interest (as the dependent variable), the two remaining types
of warfare compete against the type of warfare of interest.
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warfare, competing events become instances of conventional and symmetrical nonconventional
warfare. Finally, focusing on symmetrical nonconventional warfare (Model Four) allows for the
subhazards of conventional and irregular warfare to compete against the main event of failure
(symmetrical nonconventional warfare).
This method, by utilizing the same exact covariates in all four equations, should theoretically
generate the least biased covariate estimates possible. Also, competing risks regressions provide
two related yet distinct advantages: first, they are more flexible and thus more versatile than ordinal
logistic modeling given that the latter juxtaposes categories of outcome (consequently allowing
for comparison between categories) while the former (competing risks modeling) also allows for
the competing categories (in this case types of civil war) to have a concomitant or even prior impact
on the main event of failure. Consequently, competing risks analyses offer a third advantage that
derives from the two merits just mentioned. Coherent with the coding of civil wars in Chapter Five
(as we will see), competing risks analyses allow or at least presuppose that a change in the type of
civil war can potentially occur or that a conventional civil war can materialize when expecting the
failure of an event of irregular warfare. This flexibility that competing risks analyses promise
illustrates a more realist and a more empirically reliable model than say ordinal logistic models,
which do not allow for interactions between categories (by design). In fact, Chapter Five goes into
more detail regarding how a given civil war can change from irregular to conventional warfare
over the course of the conflict; namely when foreign aerial support assists a militarily outmatched
(relative to the incumbent) insurgency on the ground, thereby restoring the power dynamics
between the warring actors. That is to say that competing risks analyses portray an empirically
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reliable statistical model of the reality of civil war54. An algebraic representation of the hazard
function is below:
𝑝

ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0 (𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝[∑ 𝛽̂ (𝑋𝑖∗ − 𝑋𝑖 )]
𝑗=1

Where the hazard function at t disregards the effects of covariates (covariates are set to 0)
in order to generate the base hazard function (or what would equal to the intercept in a linear
regression). At t1, hazards become a function of covariate effects in changing (positively or
negatively) the probabilities of survival (or not experiencing civil war) per subject. The parameters
of the underlying hazards are allowed to vary across the four models generated: aggregated civil
war types, conventional, irregular, and symmetrical nonconventional warfare. The results are then
logged to generate the logged likelihood of survival55. As mentioned in Section 3.3, event
dependence was accounted for by recording whether subjects have relapsed into civil war. Another
dependency in the data relates to heterogeneity, or unobserved heterogeneity; this is especially
frequent when working with data across countries, such as in the case of this section. The history
of different countries has arguably followed different development pathways, some more resistant
to civil wars than others. In fact, different cultures emanating from different colonial legacies (i.e.
Portuguese colonial heritage, such as in Brazil versus Spanish dominium, such as in Argentina),
makes any attempt at comparing cross-nationally and throughout history difficult. Many elements,
in fact, deeply rooted in each individual subject’s history, may bias the results. That is why robust
standard errors clustered by country were introduced; this specification should help account for
unobservable heterogeneity not captured by the covariates. Overall, preliminary post estimation
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While standard Cox regressions offer two options, failure or nonfailure of the main event, competing risks analyses
provide at least two additional alternatives, which are the failure or nonfailure of at lease one competing event.
55
The graphical visualization of both cumulative survival and hazard functions are found in the Appendix A.
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techniques show that the models are well specified, did not exclude observations, and are not
distorted by missing data56. Of important note is that one main assumption of the Cox Proportional
Hazards model is that “the hazards of the different strata formed by the levels of the covariates are
proportional” (Abeysekera et al. 2009). Meaning that if a specific covariate effect triples the risk
of civil war at a given time t, the same magnitude of covariate effect on the hazard (or a 200%
relative increase in covariate effect on hazard), must remain unchanged throughout the whole
sample between t and tn for that subject. In testing for proportionality of covariate effects, a few
variables violated that assumption57. Corrections were provided by multiplying those covariates
by the natural log of units of time58. Other works have utilized this technique; in fact, this technique
is borrowed from other works (Box-Steffensmeir, 2001; Maeda, 2010; Hiroi et al., 2013). With
the introduction of the aforementioned specification to adhere to the assumption of proportionality
in hazard and subhazard estimates, four models were generated59. Also, it is important to mention
that the provided corrections do not hinder the parsimony of the models, simply because they are
not intended to explain variation in the dependent variable, but instead to specifically correct for
the violation of the aforementioned assumption.
4.5 Exposure to Civil War: Results
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See Appendix A for more detail on how missing data were dealt with.
The command estat phtest (for Cox Regressions-or Model 1) along with the option command tvc (or time-varying
covariates for proportional subhazards assumption) (for models two, three, and four) were used in STATA: highly
significant p values of covariates indicate that the assumption of proportionality has been violated. This method helps
to detect those covariates that had disproportional effects on hazard in order to provide needed corrections. The tables
of proportionality of hazards can be found in Appendix A.
58
Note that in the model where it is question of irregular civil wars (Model Three), no corrections were introduced as
they were not needed; none of the covariates violate the assumption of proportional subhazards when it is question of
irregular warfare (see Appendix A).
59
The stcox command in STATA is accompanied by the robust cluster by country specification and the EFRON
method (Efron 1977) in order to alleviate the estimation bias associated with time dependency error (Gerds et al. 2007)
and to help in handling tied events as some subjects share the same survival time (Borucka 2014). This specification
is only introduced when all types of civil wars are conflated together (Model 1), since it is question of standard Cox
Regressions in Model One while Models Two, Three, and Four do not allow for the aforementioned specifications
(Efron) to be introduced.
57
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Table 4.6 outlines the results of this section. In table 4.6, Model One assesses the risk
exposure to all types of civil wars conflated together. Models Two, Three, and Four examine the
risk exposure to conventional, irregular, and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars, respectively.
The results in Table 4.660 suggest that having the military as head of the executive makes
states significantly more exposed to all types of civil war. Crucially, one observation has to be
made. It is logical to posit the following: since the military as an executive significantly increases
hazards in all types of civil war (Model One), and since conventional, irregular, and symmetrical
nonconventional warfare are all subsets of civil wars, the military as an executive must have a
significant effect on all three types of civil wars (Models Two, Three, and Four). Nonetheless,
albeit perfectly logical, the aforementioned syllogism, if held to be true, would dismiss the
complexity of the theoretical distinction made between conventional, irregular, and symmetrical
nonconventional civil wars. Instead, the logic that is adhered to here conceives civil wars as having
a clear difference in how they are fought, which can explain why the same variable can predict a
conventional civil war, while failing to explain the exposure to an irregular or symmetrical
nonconventional civil war. The remaining political variable, incumbent consolidation, also fails to
achieve statistical significance in explaining any variation in the risk exposure to conventional
civil wars; thus, Hypotheses One should be rejected.
Looking at conventional civil wars, one can see that religious fractionalization indices
expose states with autocratic propensity61 to civil wars of a conventional nature. In fact, states that
fit the aforementioned criterion are 1.4 times62 more exposed to conventional civil wars than those
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The data on all three Chapters can be found in Appendix D, which presents the table of summary statistics by order
of enumeration of the Chapters.
61
By autocratic propensity, it is meant that as polity scores increase, the state in question becomes increasingly
autocratic.
62
The option nohr in STATA was used in order to generate (and thereby interpret) the coefficients of the regressions
run, as opposed to the hazards odds ratios, which is the default option. This procedure refines the analysis of the results
as it generates a straightforward interpretation of not only the statistical by also the substantive significance (on
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that do not fit this criterion. Moreover, ethnic fractionalization, when interacted with a more
pronounced autocratic propensity, makes states less exposed to conventional civil wars.
Concretely, those states are 1.3 times less likely to experience conventional warfare, relative to
states that do not fit this criterion. Also, relative to other regions, Latin America has typically
undergone civil wars of conventional nature, relative to other regions. The concrete implication to
be made here is that Latin American civil wars (at least the ones that occurred between 1946 and
2008) have commonly been motivated by political grievances.
Table 4.6. Competing Risks Analyses (Exposure to Civil War)

Main Independent Variables
Incumbent Consolidationa
Military as Executivea
Per Capita GDPa.b
Yearly GDP Growtha.b
Polity
Ethnic Frac.
Religious Frac.
Polity* Ethnic Frac.
Polity* Religious Frac.
Control Variables
Rough Terrain
Rural Population
New State (Post-1964)
Civil War Recidivist (since 1900)
Sub-Saharan Africa
MENA
Latin America
Asia
Interactive Terms
LN(Time)* Per Capita GDPc
LN(Time)* Ethnic Frac. c
LN(Time)* (Polity*Ethnic Frac.)c
LN(Time)* Rural Population c
Log Likelihood
Number of Subjects
Number of Observations
Number of Competing Events

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.16
0.573*
-0.197
0.091
0.005
0.61
-1.732
-0.337**
0.451*

0.05
0.196
0.302
-0.205
0.049
-1.18
0.582
-0.269*
0.335*

1.034
0.630*
-0.750*
-0.291
0.085
0.861
-0.422
-0.061
-0.158

-0.021
0.129
-0.605
0.110
-0.121
1.762
2.003
0.318**
-0.037

0.323
0.371
-4.468***
0.378
0.702
0.789
4.990**
0.771

0.280*
0.281
-1.652**
0.974
0.247
-0.627
3.856**
0.379

0.177
0.521*
-0.755
-0.063
-0.121
1.333
1.49
0.738

0.764
-0.747
-25.052***
-16.840***
0.496
1.579
0.588
-18.099***

-216.09
154
7483
62

-91.47
154
7483
108

-0.034*
0.940*
0.024*
-0.106*
-934.45
154
7483
0

-291.38
154
7483
80

hazards) of the covariate estimates 1.4 is the magnitude computed after considering the exponential function to the
power .335 (~ 1.4).
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a. Lagged one year. b. Logged. c. LN(Time) interactive terms correct for non-proportionality in hazards. In order to fit the table on one
page, robust standard errors are not shown. P-values: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Notes: SNC: Symmetrical Nonconventional.
MENA: Middle East and North Africa. Only significant interactive terms are shown in the above output. A full account of all interactive
terms with the logged units of time can be found in the appendix.

Looking at Model Three, which assesses the risk exposure to irregular civil wars while
conventional and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars are the two competing events, one can
see that a militarized executive significantly increases the hazards of irregular warfare. In fact,
whenever the military as an institution and the executive as a power become confounded, states
become 1.9 times more exposed to irregular warfare. Conversely, increasing per capita GDP
significantly decreases the prospects for irregular civil wars. Concretely, a standard deviation
increase in per capita GDP makes states 2.1 times more resistant to irregular warfare. Given that
GDP growth fails to reach any conventional threshold of statistical significance in predicting a
decrease in the hazards associated with irregular civil wars, Hypothesis Two can only be partially
accepted. Moreover, as opposed to other types of civil war, irregular civil wars appear to be
sensitive to changes in rural populations across states. In fact, increasing rural population makes
states, on average, more vulnerable to irregular civil war. The concrete implication for future
studies on civil war is that civil wars fought irregularly are typically guided by grievances that
oppose the urban neighborhoods to their rural surroundings and that accounting for a rural
dimension (whether in terms of population or agriculture- among other things) appears to be a
pertinent endeavor.
Finally, Model Four, which assesses the risk exposure to symmetrical nonconventional
civil wars while conventional and irregular civil wars are the two competing events, suggests that
higher autocratic scores in states with higher ethnic fractionalization are significantly vulnerable
to symmetrical nonconventional warfare. Concretely, the aforementioned quality of states makes
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them 1.4 times more likely to experience symmetrical nonconventional warfare than those that do
not fit this criterion.

4.7 Conclusion:
From the aforementioned results one can derive several conclusions. First, we mention the
main observation as it represents a strong implication for future work on civil war. If the results
prove one thing, it is that the argument against aggregating all types of civil war into one measure
is pertinent as failing to disaggregate civil wars into different types obscures the complexities that
define the unique features and empirics of each type of civil war fought, whether it is of a
conventional, irregular, or symmetrical nonconventional nature. Second, poor states seem to be
most exposed to irregular civil wars. Also, having a militarized executive also means that an
irregular civil war is looming. Consequently, in order for incumbent states to be less exposed to
civil wars, the executive as a power should be independent from the military as an institution. Also,
given that increasingly autocratic states with more prevalent religious fractionalization are well
exposed to the risk of conventional civil wars, those same states need to either democratize,
desacralize politics, or both63. Finally, given that increasingly autocratic states with higher ethnic
fractionalization are vulnerable to symmetrical nonconventional states, those same states need to
either democratize, promote nationalist principles in lieu of cultivating ethnic loyalties, or both64.
This last finding also implies that political and institutional arrangements should be conceived of
as solutions to demographic ‘problems’ (higher ethnic fractionalization indices). This finding
matches the implication of the qualitative work of Horowitz (1993). In fact, Horowitz (1993)
suggests that the only way to resolve ethnic conflict within deeply divided societies is for states to

63
64

Evidently, both propositions are not mutually exclusive.
Idem.
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democratize and to form inter-ethnic coalitions in order to reduce ethnic exclusion while rewarding
ethnic inclusion. In fact, as consolidated democracies have either developed assimilationist
policies that had the effect of dissipating ethnicities from politics (such as in the United States or
France) or embraced a culture of multiculturalism where in which, albeit different ethnicities are
explicitly visible, the respective ethnic interactions have remained peaceful such as in the United
Kingdom or in Australia (Horowitz1993).
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Chapter 5:
The Level of Violence in Civil War
This chapter works to establish a clear pattern to the variation in the level of violence
perpetrated against civilians during civil wars.
5.1. Level of Violence: Research Design
This first analysis in this Chapter assesses the overall (macro-level) variation in the level
of violence by looking at a world sample of civil wars between 1946 and 2008 and by using data
on civil war from the PRIO100 dataset (Lacina 2005). Unlike the COW dataset, used in the
previous Chapter, Chapter Four, which evaluates the extent to which states can be exposed to civil
war, PRIO100, records at least a hundred-yearly deaths as the decisive threshold upon which the
distinction between instances of political violence and outright civil war is made. There is a dual
purpose to using this dataset: first, it provides overall macro-level variation in the level of violence
per observation and through the course of the civil war. Second, the PRIO100 dataset, as opposed
to the COW dataset, helps to account for the overall level of violence by aggregating civilian and
combatant fatalities in civil war (Lacina 2005)65. After the exclusion of missing data (that were
deemed too high to interpolate), there were a total of 905 observations in the cross-sectional design
ranging from 1946 to 2008. The unit of analysis is battle-related deaths per year.
The second analysis in this Chapter conducts a micro-level analysis of the level of violence.
It also excludes instances of violence perpetrated on the battlefield in order to focus exclusively
on civilian victims. This new dataset, the Konstanz One-Sided Event Dataset (or KOSVED), is
designed in a collaborative effort (Bussman and Schneider 2012). The dataset covers 19 (of which
3 were excluded due to lack of data) instances of civil war from 1979 to 2008. The data is clustered
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Note that the Correlates of War dataset excludes all civilian deaths in order to exclusively focus on battle-related
combatant deaths (Sarkees et al. 2010).
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by days or weeks, depending on the civil war in question. Most of the civil wars cover the SubSaharan region, while also covering the war in Chechnya (1993-2006), Macedonia (1998-2001),
Azerbaijan (1990-1996), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1990-1996), Croatia (1990-1996), Slovenia
(1991), and Serbia (1998-2001)66.
The results of this analysis, which are intended to capture the micro-dynamics of civil war
violence should be consistent with those based upon the data (on a macro-level) compiled by the
PRIO100 dataset. As a result, the consistency in the results between macro and micro-level
analyses should provide an element of robustness to the theory; that is, symmetrical
nonconventional, conventional, and irregular civil wars, by this order of enumeration, showcase a
gradual rise in the level of overall direct violence committed against civilians while irregular,
symmetrical nonconventional, and conventional warfare produce a crescendo in the level of
violence on the battlefield. Evidently, a dataset that only covers 19 (of which 3 are excluded) civil
wars cannot possibly be representative. However, here are just a few reasons why this dataset was
considered, in its own right, as an integral part of this study on civil war violence. As mentioned
in the review of the literature section, the dynamics of violence peculiar to civil war always
manifests at the micro-level and in a dyadic fashion. Thus, merely focusing on the macro-level,
albeit valuable, may generate a reductionist study of civil war. Variations do exist at the micro or
subnational level. It is even argued here that micro-level variations illustrate more reliably the
dynamics of violence than macroscopic studies since the former generates a refined template of
violence by considering local-level increases or decreases in the level of violence of which macrolevel studies are by design dismissive.
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See Appendix B for details on all the civil wars included.
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Finally, and most importantly, recent studies on civil wars, albeit concise in differentiating
between asymmetries in military power between the incumbent state and insurgency (Balcells et
al. 2014), classify the entirety of a given civil war under the rubric of conventional, irregular, or
symmetrical nonconventional. One novelty of this part of the study lies in the differentiation
between regions (or districts) whereby a given insurgency may be more consolidated than in
others, at the local level. This contribution to the literature is based on the premise that in every
civil war, there exists a clear rebel stronghold, which is unique to a certain region and typically
implies weakness of the same rebel group in other locations, typically controlled by the incumbent
state. Consider the current-day Syrian civil war. It is more than challenging to characterize the
Syrian civil war, as a whole, as being fought conventionally, irregularly and so forth. In fact, the
Northern part of Syria ascribes to a clear undisputed control of one insurgent group (among many),
the Islamic State, over the civilian population of Raqqa (Weiss et al. 2015). In contrast, the
southern part of Syria, especially Damascus, its capital, is predominantly controlled by the current
incumbent state. Other factions, affiliated with Kurdish forces are also uncontestably controlling
the civilian population in the Northeast region of Qamishli. Consequently, and as a result of
different types of the weaponry in the aforementioned regions of Syria, the war is fought differently
depending on where the combat is taking place. This observation can be extended to different civil
wars. The case of Venezuela in the 1960’s shows how the insurgents, while enjoying a foothold in
the interior llanos or plains, also took control of the Andean region of Venezuela (Crowley 1987)
[as cited in (Arjona et al. 2015:51). Thus, while coding a civil war as fitting one of three categories
is parsimonious and therefore generalizable, it may be empirically inaccurate to code the entirety
of a civil war, especially when the latter is lengthy, as pertaining to one type of civil war. While
this bias in coding is ineluctable on a macro-level, micro-level data helps to alleviate this bias by
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matching the coding of several instances of violence perpetrated against civilians in the same civil
war with different and evolving spatial-temporal modes of violence within that same civil war.
Below are four hypotheses that this Chapter attempts to confirm or reject.
5.2. Level of Violence: Hypotheses
Hypothesis 5: Irregular civil wars should generate the highest level of violence perpetrated
against civilians (outside of the battlefield), conventional civil wars should
provoke a decrease in civilian deaths and symmetrical nonconventional warfare
should cause the fewest civilian deaths.
Hypothesis 6: Irregular, symmetrical nonconventional, and conventional civil wars
should produce a crescendo in the level of violence on the battlefield,
respectively.
Hypothesis 7: Higher democratic scores should reduce the level of overall violence both on and
off the battlefield and regardless of the type of war being fought.
Hypothesis 8: Increasing wealth, along with economic growth, should decrease the size of
the insurgency, which is likely to decrease the level of violence both on and off the
battlefields and regardless of the type of war being fought.
Hypothesis 9: Higher ethnic and religious fractionalization indices should increase the level of
overall violence both on and off the battlefield and regardless of the type of war
being fought.

5.3. Level of Violence: Sources of data and operationalization of variables
a. Dependent variables
There are a total of two dependent variables in this analysis. The first aggregates civilians
and combatants and gauges the severity of the violence in its totality during a civil war (battlerelated deaths). The second dependent variable, while exclusively measuring civilian deaths,
gauges the severity in the level of violence in areas with dense civilian inhabitance, thus, not on
the battlefield. Of course, this is assuming that the geography of the battlefield is clearly distinct
from that of residential areas. In other words, it is assumed that the location of the battlefield and
that of residential areas do not spatially overlap. While Guevara (1967), Mao (1978), Wood
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(2003) argue that the region of the battlefield and that of residential areas overlap when irregular
civil wars are fought, the significant difference in deaths on the battlefield and those outside of
it67 provide at least some support to the premise that the location of the battlefield and that of
residential areas do not spatially overlap, regardless of the type of civil war. The data on battlerelated deaths (in the first dependent variable) is borrowed from the works of Lacina (2005) and
Lacina (2009); the latter provides and extension to the data originally compiled in the work of the
former. Lacina (2009) disaggregates annual fatalities into three different types: low, high, and
best estimations68 (Lacina 2009, codebook).
The data for the second dependent variable is adapted from the KOSVED dataset (2012).
It reports the daily or weekly deaths of civilians at the hands of either the incumbent state or the
insurgent (never both concomitantly). The data on civilian deaths is disaggregated according to
the type of weaponry used (by either the incumbent state or the insurgent) that caused each civilian
fatality. The dataset covers a broader parameter of violence by including harm done to civilians
along with differentiation between the sex, the age, and the nationality of the targets (Schneider
et al. 2012). For the purposes of this research, the key variables that were considered in this study
are those that have information on how many civilians were killed as a function of the type of
weaponry used. There are seven types of weaponry that can cause death: the number of civilians
killed by primitive weapons such as “spears, axes, machetes, and clubs” (Schneider et al. 2012),
by shootings, by bombings (grenades), by suicide attacks, by tank attacks, by aircraft attacks
(aerial bombings), and by weapons of mass destruction (whether of chemical, biological, or
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The total number of battle-related deaths is 6,607,467 while that of civilian deaths outside of the battleground
reaches 18,503; the equivalent of 106,572 deaths per year (over 62 years) regarding the former and 804 deaths per
year (over 23 years) in the case of the latter.
68
The regressions run only considered the best estimates, in order to avoid both an overestimation (high estimation of
deaths) and an underestimation (low estimation of deaths) of annual casualties.
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radiological nature) (Schneider et al. 2012). The dependent variable was generated after summing
the data for all the aforementioned modes of killings69. Note that the number of civilians who
have directly succumbed to civil war violence without known modes of killing were not accounted
for in the study. In fact, not knowing the type of weapons used to kill a civilian makes it impossible
to code an instance of civil war as fitting one of the three categories: conventional, irregular, or
symmetrical nonconventional warfare.
b. Independent variables
The main independent variable for both analyses in this Chapter are the same: the type of
civil war being fought; coded as one for conventional warfare, two and three for cases of irregular
and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars, respectively. With the first dataset, the data on the
type of civil war being fought comes from the work of Balcells et al. (2014) whereby again,
militaristic sophistication and capability of the incumbent state and the insurgent creates an index
of power parity (or mismatch), which consequently determines whether the war is fought
conventionally and so forth.
The same variable, the type of civil war being fought, is coded using a novel and
empirically more refined technique of differentiating between different types of civil wars being
fought within the same state and during the same time periods. This coding procedure is considered
more representative of each individual case of civil war, at the district level. The coding of every
individual instance of violence perpetrated against civilians is a function of, not only the weaponry
deployed (as it has been the case thus far within a nascent literature on civil war violence), but also
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Note that primitive weaponry can be much deadlier than other modes of killing, such as bombing. The average
minimal number of civilian deaths as a result of the use of primitive weaponry is 25 while the minimal number of
civilian deaths as a result of the use of grenades is 13. Also, the maximal toll generated by the use of tanks reaches
60, while the minimal estimation of primitive weaponry reaches 470 deaths, also representing its maximal value. Thus,
using heavy artillery such as tanks is not highly associated with or endogenous to subsequent high levels of violence.
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of the tactics available to the incumbent state and the insurgent that are used concurrently with
weapons.
There are twelve tactics available to both the incumbent state and the insurgent over the
course of a civil war. The data, along with the explanation of what each tactic entails, are compiled
in Schneider et al. (2012) and are listed in Appendix B. For the sake of this study, only the
following twelve tactics are possible and available to both the incumbent state and the insurgent
over the course of a given civil war: looting, scorched earth tactics, starvation, human shields,
target assassination, torture, hostage taking, kidnapping, deportation, disappearances, camps, and
sieges. Two assumptions deserve elaboration: first, it is assumed that for instances where weapons
of mass destruction, airstrikes, and tanks are used, it is always to the favor of the incumbent, as it
is assumed that the insurgent does not enjoy either the resources or the knowhow to maneuver such
weaponry. However, in instances where the insurgents are able rely upon friendly foreign actors
that use heavy weaponry against the current incumbent, this external involvement restores the
balance of power between the insurgent and the incumbent, changing the coding of the civil war
from irregular to conventional warfare70.
Consequently, for every instance where the aforementioned three weapons (weapons of
mass destruction, airstrikes, and tanks) are used, conventional and symmetrical nonconventional
warfare are naturally excluded. This is because using extremely high-tech weaponry distorts the
power parity between the incumbent state and the insurgent to the favor of the incumbent state,
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Such was the case of the Bosnian insurgency that relied on air support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(or NATO) against the Serbs in September 1995 (Schneider et al. 2012). Also, one can think of the military support
and Armenian military budget transfer as a way of supporting the insurgency in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh in
1991 Azerbaijan (Schneider et al. 2012, Balcells et al. 2014). This logic equally applies to whenever the current
incumbent state enjoys external military support to fight off the insurgency; which consequently changes the coding
of the civil war from conventional to irregular (Rwandan Patriotic Front supported the Forces Armées Congolaises or
the Congolese Armed Forces through airstrikes on the regions of Losenda and Bunia in Zaire-or nowadays known as
the Democratic Republic of Congo- on the 10th of July 2000 and the 29th of January 2001, respectively (Schneider et
al. 2012).
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thus the war is not fought conventionally. Also, since there are extremely high-tech weapons
being used, the war is not fought in symmetrical nonconventional mode71. The second assumption
is that power relations between the incumbent and the insurgent are always a function of the
incumbent’s initial state power: this assumption derives from the notion that the prevalence of
rebels and the success at consolidating their insurgency are due to a great extent to the incumbent
state weakening or the outright absence within areas over which rebels claim control (Crowley
1987:50) [as cited in Arjona et al. (2015)].
The following scenarios illustrate how an instance of civil war was coded72. Consider an
example of an incumbent or an insurgent engaging the civilian population in live ammunition.
This information by itself does not help in clearly identifying the subsequent type of civil war. In
fact, direct shooting can constitute instances of all three types of civil war. However, whenever
the incumbent or the insurgent uses specific tactics concomitantly with engaging in live
ammunition, it allows for an unambiguous (or at least less ambiguous) coding of the civil war 73.
Concretely, five tactics presuppose a certain militaristic, logistic, and political weakness of the
actor who uses them: looting, scorched earth tactics 74, human shields, hostage taking, and
kidnapping. In fact, looting, hostage taking, and kidnapping all suggest that the given actor faces
financial trouble, which can greatly undermine its militaristic power and consequently its
legitimate governing authority. Also, an actor that is forced out of a community or location (by
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The mode of killing- through the choice of weaponry- very rarely overlaps with another, meaning that there exist
very few instances where civilians could have died as a result of a direct shooting or airstrikes at the same time (cases
that fit the aforementioned category were considered missing because of ambiguous coding).
72
The type of civil war is a categorical variable taking a value of 1 for conventional civil wars, while the values of 2
and 3 constitute episodes of irregular and symmetrical nonconventional warfare, respectively.
73
Note that in cases whereby there is no data on auxiliary tactics when both incumbents and insurgents were engaging
in direct shooting, the observations were considered missing.
74
In considering the example of scorched earth tactics, common sense dictates that an actor that has established a
stronghold in a region will not set it on fire. Conversely, using such tactics become much more viable once that same
actor loses its grip on that region.
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the rival actor) can find using scorched earth tactics feasible, viable, and even beneficial: as it
recently lost control over the region it used to be under its authority, the actor involved is not
expected to offer strong governance or to provide for the community over which it recently ruled,
quite the opposite. This tactic suggests that the actor aims at making the area it recently fled
“uninhabitable” (Schneider et al. 2012). Also by using scorched earth tactics it implies that the
actor had to flee a certain region over which it recently controlled, which is symptomatic of
military and strategic weakening. Finally, using human shields implies the notion that the
incumbent state has failed to provide reliable militaristic power to retaliate against the insurgent,
or that the rebels have failed to consolidate their insurgency when confronting the incumbent
state.
On the other hand, other tactics imply strength of one actor, relative to another, in leading
counter-insurgency or insurgency operations whenever the actor is the incumbent state or the
insurgent, respectively. Seven tactics are indicative of such strength: starvation, target
assassination, torture, deportation, disappearances, camps, and sieges. In fact, target
assassination, along with deportation, disappearances, and torture imply that the actor who uses
them enjoy high quality information on ‘where to strike’. Unlike kidnapping for instance, which
is deemed in this study to target civilians indiscriminately, the aforementioned tactics aim at
neutralizing specific targets. Thus, the presupposition here is that the actor has had to collaborate
with part of the civilian population in order to gather reliable and quality information to support
its counter-insurgency (or insurgency) operations. Likewise, camps and sieges entail a high
concentration of military checkpoints (whether the incumbent state’s or the insurgent’s) within
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and at the outskirts of the region that the given actor claims to control, to the point where imposing
sieges and camps become feasible and sustainable75.
More broadly, this coding should widen our conception of civil war by introducing microlevel variation to which the population is sensitive, namely when it comes to identifying a pattern
to lethal violence while also contextualizing the violence unique to the intensity of civil war of
which civilians pay the price. After all, weapons can change as technology evolves or as external
actors intervene in order to militarily (or otherwise) assist the incumbent state (or the insurgent)
in its confrontation with the current opposing actor. However, the tactics mentioned, more than
often are auxiliary to the recourse to direct violence. The aforementioned tactics, such as scorched
earth, unlike conventional weaponry, date back to at least the American Civil War (Pringle 2010).
Thus, technologically advanced weapons, given their changing nature over time, fail to establish
a clear framework of dominated vs. dominant or one of power parity between the incumbent state
and the insurgent when tactics, namely given their ubiquity and historical prevalence (Arjona et
al. 2015), therefore, the exclusion of such is warranted.
The remaining explanatory variables in this Chapter are consistent with those featured in
Chapter Four. These variables once again measure the political, economic, geographic, and
demographic condition of a state. The political variable included, the Polity IV score, gauges the
extent to which democratic propensity can decrease the level of overall violence. It is argued here
that polity scores have a pacifying impact by reducing the overall level of violence in civil wars,
regardless of the type of war being fought, both on and off the battlefield76. The first economic
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Note that in instances within which the identity of the perpetrator (whether the incumbent state or the insurgent)
was unclear or unknown, the observations were considered missing in order to subsequently avoid ambiguous coding
of the type of civil war.
76
Refer back to Chapter Four in order to understand how Polity scores were operationalized. Also, as pointed out on
page 41, this Chapter along with Chapter Six both use Polity IV data as is (unlike Chapter Four); increasing Polity
Scores indicate that the state in question is increasingly becoming democratic.
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variable captures the average wealth of the population, while the second measures the overall
health of the economy; the former is per capita GDP and the latter is yearly GDP growth. The
data on per capita GDP is borrowed from the Maddison Project (Bolt et al. 2014). Each per capita
GDP data point was logged in order to narrow disparities between dollarized amounts. Yearly
GDP change is also an interval level data, with equal intervals of one percent. The data on
elevation (the only geographic variable) is again adapted from the work of Balcells et al. (2014).
It is measured in intervals, which considers the logged estimation of elevation per observation.
Note that this covariate is time-invariant per subject in the first dataset but varies within
observations (at the municipal level) in the second dataset (KOSVED)77. By including elevation
in this particular analysis, it should indicate the effect that mountainous terrain has on the microlevel variation in the level of violence off the battlefield. Finally, the data on religious and ethnic
fractionalization is borrowed from the work of Fearon et al. (2003), and is time-invariant in both
analyses.
Two control variables are introduced: one binary variable that capture the effect of the
Sub-Saharan Africa region. Kalyvas (2001; 2006) tells us that violence is deeply shaped by
culture in a region. In addition, Fearon et al. (2003) suggest that most civil wars occur in SubSaharan Africa. Thus, for the two aforementioned reasons, it is warranted to control for the region
of Sub-Saharan Africa78. Total population is also accounted for, since it is legitimate to argue that
consolidated (or weak) insurgencies or counterinsurgencies can be directly explained, at least
partially, by higher (or lower) population rates. Consequently, higher or lower population rates
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We matched the coordinates of each district-level observation (in the second dataset-KOSVED) with the exact
altitude in meters so that elevation points vary as a result of variation in the coordinates (at the district-level).
78
Note that it is even more important to control for the Sub-Saharan African region in the second dataset since out of
2833 observations (including missing data), 1766 (or 62%) occur in Sub Saharan Africa. Consequently, controlling
for that region alleviates spatial dependency in the data.
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can have a direct impact on the levels of violence perpetrated against both combatants and
civilians (PRIO100 dataset) and strictly against civilians (KOSVED dataset). The data on
population rates come from the Maddison Project (Bolt et al. 2014). Given the high disparity
between observations in terms of population rates, the population estimates were logged.
5.4 Level of Violence: Methods
The dependent variables in this part of the study are in count mode. In other words, the
variation in outcome that the study assesses relates to the variation in the number of victims, first
by conflating together combatant and civilian deaths (PRIO100 dataset) and then by isolating
combatant casualties and focusing exclusively on civilian deaths (KOSVED dataset).
Consequently, the two sets of results are generated using negative binomial regressions.
More specifically, in the first analysis using the PRIO100 data and in the second using the
KOSVED data, the model of choice is dynamic pooled negative binomial set of regressions with
a “cluster by country code” option, in order to generate robust standard errors (that were not
substantially different from classical standard errors; which hints to an overall robust model
specification). Moreover, Poisson regressions showed serious misspecifications in the models79.
This is mainly due to the fact that in both datasets, the variance in the number of deaths was
substantially greater to the mean value of deaths80. Below is the algebraic representation of the
function of the standard negative binomial regression:
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Also, the Vuoung (1989) test, run after every negative binomial regression, tells us that the z-scores of the former
regressions were statistically insignificant in being different from the z-scores of zero-inflated negative binomial
regressions, indicating that the specification of inflation of zero-death counts is not preferred to the standard negative
binomial parameterization (Burger et al. 2009). This can be expected since there are a total of two zero-events in the
dataset.
80
There are approximately seven mean deaths recorded in the KOSVED dataset, while the variance is at 1061 deaths.
Likewise, there are approximately 7295 mean deaths recorded in the PRIO100 dataset, while the variance is at
7.21e+08 deaths. The use of negative binomial corrects for the misspecification of the overall models by controlling
for the overdispersion in the data (or when the variance is greater than the mean value) (Lindén et al. 2011).
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𝑝

𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜇𝑖 ) = 𝛼 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖
𝑗=1

Where the log at the mean value of deaths is equal to the intercept 𝛼 plus the sum of the
products of the covariate coefficients. Note that introducing a log term into the right-hand side of
the equation will allow for a straightforward interpretation of the coefficients, similar to a linear
regression. The difference between the parameter of the negative binomial and that of the Poisson
mainly lies in the potential of the former to be more flexible than the latter in allowing the
structure of the mean to change. Below is the relationship between the mean and the variance in
negative binomial parameterization:
𝛾𝑖= (1-𝑘𝑖 ) 𝜇𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖= (1 − 𝑘𝑖 )𝜇𝑖 (1 + 𝑎𝜇𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖 𝜇𝑖 )
The first equation represents the mean structure and the second the variance within death counts,
given the set of data𝛾𝑖 . Note that whenever k, which represents the parameter of zero-death counts,
equals or approaches zero, zero-inflated negative binomial81 parameters become increasingly
similar to those of the standard negative binomial and are also reduced to Poisson whenever a (or
the log-transformed alpha value82) equals or approaches zero (Ismail et al. 2013).
5.5 Level of Violence: Results
The results in both analyses (meaning using the two datasets) are disaggregated into four
models, which gradually introduce new explanatory variables and model specification. Model 1
features a bivariate analysis in order to capture the raw level of violence per type of civil war.
Also, going from a bivariate model to multivariate should indicate the extent to which the results
are robust to the inclusion of new variables. Model 2 accounts for per capita GDP, GDP growth,
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Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial regressions account for excess zeros (hence the name of the model) in a given set
of data (Cameron et al. 2013).
82
The log-transformed alpha value, denoted as lnalpha in the models, represents the parameter of overdispersion in
the data.
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ethnic and religious fractionalization83, and rough terrain. Model 3 introduces the two control
variables, namely total population and the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, Model 4
controls for the duration of each conflict and introduces duration as an exposure variable to the
overall level of violence. It is deemed important to this study to control for the fact that an
observation can record 25 deaths while another, documents a 1000 within the same time frame.
In addition to population rates, considering duration of the conflict as an exposure variable to the
overall level of violence should theoretically alleviate this dependency in the data.
Moving onto the results based on the first dataset (PRIO100), Model 1 estimated in table
5.6 puts into perspective conventional and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars in relation to
irregular civil wars (the base or reference category). Two reasons can justify the fact that irregular
civil wars were chosen as the reference category in both analyses. Irregular civil wars are the most
frequent type of civil wars recorded in both datasets (the coding of Balcells et al. 2014 in the first
and my own coding in the second dataset). In fact, 83.98% of all civil wars were fought irregularly,
versus 13.37% and 2.65% that were fought conventionally and symmetrically but
unconventionally, respectively, in the first dataset. Also, albeit more equally distributed, 64.56%
of all civil wars were fought irregularly, versus 15.5% and 19.95% that were fought conventionally
and symmetrically but unconventionally, respectively, in the second dataset. Thus, given the clear
prevalence of irregular civil war occurrence, relative to the other two types, it seems sensible to
set irregular civil wars as the reference category. Also, on a theoretical note, I argue that irregular
civil wars follow a unique pathway or trajectory of violence while conventional and symmetrical
nonconventional civil wars tend to behave similarly; the difference in the level of violence between
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The KOSVED data, from which derive the results of the second set of regressions, did not make possible the
simultaneous introduction of ethnic and fractionalization indices into the same models because of high association
between those two variables, which is explained in more detail in Table 5.7.
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conventional and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars is one of degrees, and not of direction
of violence. Thus, for the two aforementioned reasons, irregular civil wars were chosen as the
reference category84.
Looking at the results in table 5.6 one can see that, throughout all four models, symmetrical
nonconventional civil wars are on average less violent than irregular civil wars. This observation
is robust to both the inclusions of different variables (Models 2 and 3) and to alternative model
specifications (Model 4). Thus, fighting a symmetrical nonconventional civil war results in 258.4%
(in relative terms) fewer deaths than fighting an irregular civil war (Model 1). More specifically,
fighting a symmetrical nonconventional civil war, relative to an irregular civil war, is likely to
decrease the log count of deaths by 258.4%. Additionally, after introducing other explanatory
variables, fighting symmetrical nonconventional civil wars, relative to fighting irregular civil wars,
results in a decrease in the log count of deaths of 211.6%, 212.8%, and 205.7% (Models 2, 3, and
4, respectively). Therefore, in all the models generated, symmetrical nonconventional civil wars
appear to be less violent than irregular civil wars on the battlefield.
Conventional civil wars, however, albeit positively signed, fail to explain the rise in the
level of violence on the battlefield, relative to irregular civil wars85. While the positive sign
associated with conventional civil wars is consistent with the theoretical framework, namely that
conventional civil wars are more lethal on the battlefield than irregular civil wars, the results are
inconclusive, due to the lack of statistical significance in accompanying this increase in the level
of violence.

84

Note that it does not matter which type of civil war is chosen to be the reference category, as the results should
remain the same. However, the rationale for choosing the reference category was explained so that the reader
understands the logic behind such an endeavor.
85
Note that even when dropping the observation with the highest number of battle-related deaths (during the Chinese
civil war that cost the lives of 350000 in 1946 according to the best estimates), the regressions were rerun (not shown)
and conventional civil wars were still predominantly (across all models) the most violent type of civil war on the
battlefield, albeit remaining statistically insignificant.
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Moving onto the auxiliary explanatory variables and looking closely at polity scores, the
results suggest that when at war, more democratic states tend to cause fewer deaths than their
counterparts, or less democratic nations. With every interval increase in a polity score there is a
decrease in the log count of deaths anywhere between 108.9 and 109% (Models 2, 3, and 4). These
findings provide support for Hypothesis 7. Likewise, per capita GDP appears to lower the number
of casualties. In fact, with every interval increase of per capita GDP there is a 186.9% decrease in
the log count of deaths (Model 2), along with a 184.4% and a 183% decrease in the log count of
deaths with every interval increase in per capita GDP (Models 3 and 4, respectively). GDP growth,
surprisingly positive, is devoid of any statistical relevance when explaining the variation in the
overall level of violence on the battlefield. Also, ethnic fractionalization has actually the strongest
substantive effect on decreasing the death count on the battlefield. In fact, with every increase in
the probability of randomly selecting two individuals from different ethnicities—which is the
parameter of ethnic and religious fractionalization indices elaborated in the work of Fearon et al.
(2003)—the level of overall battlefield violence decreases the log count of deaths by 359.8%,
358.3%, and 357.3% in Models 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Note that the remaining variables, namely
religious fractionalization, elevation points (mountainous terrain), population rates and the SubSaharan Africa, are all devoid of statistical significance in explaining the variation in the log counts
of deaths that succumbed to battlefield violence.
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Table 5.6. Negative Binomial Regressions on Combatant and Civilian Deaths
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

1.091
(0.70)
-1.584**
(0.50)

0.333
(0.32)
-1.116*
(0.44)

0.261
(0.33)
-1.128*
(0.44)

0.377
(0.34)
-1.507*
(0.43)

-0.089***

-0.089***

-0.090***

(0.02)
-0.869***

(0.02)
-0.844***

(0.02)
-0.830***

(0.13)
0.069

(0.13)
0.041

(0.13)
0.045

(0.06)
-2.598***
(0.60)
0.423
(0.68)
0.101

(0.08)
-2.583***
(0.71)
0.548
(0.77)
0.090

(0.08)
-2.573***
(0.72)
0.276
(0.81)
0.067

(0.11)

(0.14)
0.030
(0.09)
0.530
(0.53)

(0.15)
0.018
(0.09)
0.530
(0.53)

Dependent variable: Battle-Related
Deaths (PRIO100 data)
Conventional Civil Wars
SNC Civil Wars
Reference Category: Irregular Civil Wars
Auxiliary Variables:
Polity Scoresa
Per Capita

GDPa

GDP Growtha.b
Ethnic Frac.
Religious Frac.
Rough Terrainb
Populationa.b
Sub-Saharan Africa

lnalpha
Constant
0.917***
0.496***
0.495***
0.500***
Pseudo R-Square
0.005
0.038
0.038
0.038
No. Of Observations
905
895
895
895
a. Lagged one year. b. Logged. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. P-values: * p<0.05, **
p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: Standard Errors of constants are not shown. Note: SNC: Symmetrical Nonconventional.

Below are the results explaining the variation in the overall level of violence perpetrated
strictly against civilians by the warring actors, namely the incumbent state and the insurgent. As
one can see in table 5.7, the results which put into perspective the subsequent impact of the main
independent variable—the type of civil war—on the variation of the level of violence perpetrated
strictly against civilians (or non-combatants) support the argument that irregular civil wars are, on
average, much deadlier than conventional civil wars.
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Fighting conventional civil wars, relative to irregular ones, causes a decrease of 211.3% in
the log counts of civilian deaths. In fact, fighting conventional civil wars, relative to irregular ones,
reduces the log count of deaths by 165.6, 169, and 172.3% (Models 2, 3, and 4, respectively). Also,
fighting symmetrical nonconventional civil wars, in relation to irregular civil wars, produce a
decrease in the log count of civilian deaths of 175.4%, (Model 1). Likewise, whenever symmetrical
nonconventional civil wars are fought, the log count of civilian deaths is expected to decrease by
171.1, 168.2, and 168.2% (Models 2, 3, and 4, respectively), relative to irregular civil wars.
Thus, looking at all types of civil war at both macro and micro-levels of analysis, irregular
civil wars are the deadliest, more so off the battlefield than on it, and thus more lethal for civilians
than for combatants. Moreover, it appears that controlling for the duration of the conflict (Model
Four) makes symmetrical nonconventional civil wars deadlier for civilians than conventional
warfare. The implication for future work on civil war that would adhere to the disaggregation of
civil wars as a function of how they are fought is that protracted conflicts typically suggest that,
relative to irregular civil wars (still the deadliest for civilians), symmetrical nonconventional
warfare generates more violence perpetrated against civilians than conventional ones.
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Table 5.7: Negative Binomial Regressions on Civilian Deaths
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-1.113***
(0.2)
-0.754*
(0.37)

-0.656**
(0.23)
-0.711***
(0.19)

-0.690**
(0.22)
-0.682***
(0.19)

-0.723***
(0.19)
-0.682***
(0.18)

0.077
(0.04)

0.101
(0.05)

0.084
(0.06)

Per Capita GDPa

-0.772**
(0.28)

-0.077
(0.31)

-0.303
(0.41)

GDP Growtha.b

0.169**
(0.06)
-2.298*
(1.14)

-0.369***
(0.11)
-2.825*
(1.17)

-0.383***
(0.11)
-2.537*
(1.11)

-0.284
(0.3)

-0.201
(0.38)
0.496**
(0.17)
0.404
(0.44)

-0.124
(0.39)
0.525**
(0.18)
-0.022
(0.62)
-0.001
(0.01)

Dependent variable: Battle-Related
Deaths (PRIO100 data)
Conventional Civil Wars
SNC Civil Wars
Reference Category: Irregular Civil Wars
Auxiliary Variables:
Polity Scoresa

Ethnic Frac.b
Rough Terrainb
Populationa.b
Sub-Saharan Africa
Duration

lnalpha
Constant
0.541**
0.379**
0.374**
0.371**
Pseudo R-Square
0.0121
0.0319
0.0328
0.0334
No. Of Observations
742
659
659
659
a. Logged. b. Note that, unlike the dataset used to generate table 5.6, the data that we use to measure civilian victimization
is set in a way whereby ethnic and religious fractionalization are highly positively correlated (88.97%). Thus, we run religious
fractionalization separately (results not shown) in order to avoid collinearity between explanatory variables and find an
overall decreasing level of violence against civilians associated with religious fractionalization scores; which is expected
since both ethnic and religious fractionalization indices are again highly positively correlated. Thus, given that ethnic
fractionalization strongly decreases the overall the level of violence against civilians, religious fractionalization alleviates
civilian victimization.
Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. P-values: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: Standard
Errors of constants are not shown. Note: SNC: Symmetrical Nonconventional.

Looking at the remaining auxiliary variables, higher polity scores, appear to stimulate
violence against civilians. In fact, Models 2, 3 and 4 show an increase (albeit statistically
insignificant) in the level of civilian deaths as a result of interval increases in polity scores, which
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clearly contradicts Hypothesis 786. Moreover, per capita GDP, while statistically significant
(Model 2) in its effect to decrease the log count of civilian deaths (by 177.2%), it loses its statistical
significance after controlling for population rates and the Sub-Saharan African region (Model 3)
and introducing duration of the conflict as an exposure variable to the level of overall deaths
(Model 4). The loss in significance may be attributed to two distinct yet related circumstances.
First, per capita GDP, because of the time periods (cluster of days) in which the data from
KOSVED is set, fails to vary substantively from one observation to the next. Also, it can be argued
that per capita GDP increases (or decreases) may have a more nuanced temporal relationship that
can conceivably be captured by a one year posterior lag (_n+1) on the overall level of violence
perpetrated against civilians during a civil war87. Unfortunately, mainly due to the structure of the
dataset, it is more than challenging to escape or even correct for the aforementioned two biases.
This issue is less severe for the equations estimated in Chapter 4 since the time structure is in years
(thus allowing for a delayed effect of per capita GDP on influencing the direction of violence) and
since there are no repeated time values in the PRIO100 dataset, as opposed to the KOSVED
dataset88. The same exact observation can be made when looking at GDP growth rates, which,
albeit statistically significant, gauges a yearly measure of economic activity when the rest of the
data is set in days or weeks. Thus, Hypothesis 8 can only be partially confirmed. Also, ethnic
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It should be noted that, as a result of supposing that an instrument that captures the overall democratic propensity
of a given polity on a national level can adequately define the democratic polity at the subnational level, polity scores
may not be the optimal measure of democracy. Unfortunately, there exists no work, to the best of my knowledge,
which attempts to measure potential differences in democratic polity within a state itself, at the subnational unit, let
alone in a cross-sectional design.
87
Given that the set of data is in days or cluster of days, lagging the data by one year is counterproductive and distorts
with the veracity of the data. Also, lagging variables that are in daily values by years is somewhat of an ecological
fallacy, whereby different levels of analysis become confounded when they should be independent from one another.
Finally, lagging by one year (or more) is counterproductive when there are repeated time values in a given dataset
(which is the case of the data of KOSVED).
88
While some works have suggested road density as a potential proxy for per capita GDP on a subnational level
(Buhaug and Rød 2006), we have unfortunately failed to find complete, reliable, and evolving data on the subject
matter.
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fractionalization greatly reduces the level of overall violence perpetrated against civilians. So, with
every standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization there is a decrease in the log count of
civilian deaths by 329.8, 382.5, and 353.7% (Models 2, 3, and 4, respectively).
Given the results of the macro-level variation in battlefield lethality (PRIO100 dataset),
one can argue that ‘new’ civil wars (since the year 1985 onward), provide continuity both in space
and time of the same observation; that is, civil wars-regardless of their type-appear to cause fewer
battle-related casualties in highly ethnically fractionalized communities while religious
fractionalization alleviates civilian victimization89 while inflating battle-related deaths. Likewise,
civilian victimization seems to be less prevalent and less intense within communities with high
ethnic fractionalization at war.
Moving onto the geographic covariate, rough terrain, the latter is devoid of any statistical
significance in decisively indicating a vector or a univocal direction of violence perpetrated against
civilians (as it is negatively signed throughout Models 2, 3, and 4). The only possible explanation
for the lack of statistical significance is the fact that throughout most of the civil wars recorded in
the KOSVED dataset, the number of civilian casualties is randomly distributed across multiple
and different elevation points, which suggests a lack of a systematic pattern in the diffusion of
violence across different elevation points. The coding of elevation, as opposed to that of most of
the auxiliary variables90, rigorously reflects each location’s longitude and latitude coordinates so
that elevation points corresponding to actual district-level localities could be generated. The lack
in significance of the impact of elevation on the overall variation in the level of violence contradicts
the findings of Kalyvas (2006) and Kalyvas et al. (2009), which focus exclusively on the level of
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Again the results for how religious fractionalization alleviates overall civilian victimization (KOSVED dataset) are
not shown.
90
The auxiliary variables exclude the main independent variable, or the type of civil war being fought.
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civil war violence perpetrated against civilians in Greece (1943) and in the Republic of Vietnam
(1969) respectively.
5.6 Conclusion:
To conclude, irregular civil wars are the deadliest for civilians. Although the results for
conventional civil wars are weaker, it is suggested that conventional civil wars are the most lethal
on the battlefield. Both analyses in this Chapter are consistent, in that irregular civil war is the
most lethal form of warfare insofar as civilians are concerned, and relative to the two other types
of civil war. Finally, this finding has empirical implications when it comes to identifying the nature
of future civil wars, which is that there should be an urgency to humanitarianly intervene when a
given civil war is of an irregular nature.
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Chapter 6:
Consolidation Against Civil War
The purpose of this Chapter is to delineate a clear pattern whereby states decisively
consolidate against the risk of civil war91 across time and space, utilizing a global sample.
6.1. Consolidation Against Civil War: Research Design
For the purposes of this study, states either move toward or away from consolidation
against civil war. Consolidation is conceived of as a quality to be inferred rather than one being
directly measured. Consolidation against civil war signifies that, as time passes, states should
experience a decisive decrease in the number of civil wars fought. Conversely, moving away from
consolidation against civil war suggests that states become increasingly civil war-prone, as time
passes. As explained in Section 3.4, it is important to analyze historical variations as far back as
the data allows. Also, considering a world sample of cases should theoretically provide a
representative, clear, and visible dynamic of consolidation against civil war. Thus, this section
builds upon the data on civil war collected from the Correlates of War, which records civil wars
since the beginning of the 19th century all the way to 200792.
In order to be able to confirm or reject the hypotheses, this study undergoes seven sets of
disaggregation. This disaggregation captures how different qualities of nations, such as their
democratic or autocratic propensity, their respective levels of wealth and economic growth rates,
can influence the historical points in time upon which asserting that they have consolidated against
civil war becomes feasible. The first analysis looks at the overall world sample of cases between
1820 and 200793. The second and third analyses focus on states whereby democracy has been

91

In this section all three types of civil wars are conflated together for the reason mentioned in section 3.4.
Unlike the PRIO dataset, which focuses on civil wars that have occurred between 1946 and 2008.
93
See Appendix C for more detail on dropped cases mainly because of a general lack of data.
92
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prevalent and/or autocracy has been rampant throughout the history since a state’s formation. The
fourth and fifth analyses assess rich and poor nations. Finally, the sixth and seventh analyses
evaluate the performance or impact of states experiencing economic prosperity versus those
experiencing lower levels of economic growth on the consolidation against civil war. Each discrete
analysis features the same number of observations, which is 188. Each observation represents a
year between 1820 and 2007. Every observation can record anywhere between zero and ten (the
maximum) civil wars for a given year. This study is thus built using a simple time-series design
(without a cross-section specification) whereby the years of interest are between 1820 and 2007
inclusive. The unit of analysis is the total civil war count per year.
6.2. Consolidation Against Civil War: Hypotheses
Hypothesis 10: States that have a higher democratic propensity should move toward
consolidation against civil war while their autocratic counterparts should move
away from consolidation.
Hypothesis 11: States that experience a robust increase in wealth should move toward
consolidation against civil war while their less wealthy counterparts should
move away from consolidation.
Hypothesis 12: States that experience high economic growth levels should
move toward consolidation against civil war while lower income growth earners
should move away from consolidation.

6.3. Consolidation Against Civil War: Source of data and operationalization of variables
a. Dependent variable94
The dependent variable is a count variable, which represents the number of civil wars
fought per year. Since the data from the COW dataset, a civil war occurs whenever the death toll
of combatants reaches 1000 in a twelve-month period (Sarkees et al. 2010).

94

Section 6.3.1 is intentionally brief since the coding along with the data and what constitutes civil war were amply
outlined and explained in section 4.3.1.
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b. Independent variables
The first independent variable is measured using the polity scores. To reiterate what has
been explained in previous Chapters, the variable ‘polity scores’ is an interval level variable which
measures the democratic propensity of a state on a scale of 21 values. The value +10 represents a
consolidated democracy while a value of -10 constitutes an institutionalized autocracy (Marshall
and Jaggers 2014). The way we gauge how democracy or autocracy has been recurring for a same
state since its formation is to sum all Polity IV individual annual scores per state and consider an
overall positive sum as indicative of an overall historically rooted prevalence of democracy versus
a negative sum suggestive of an overall historically embedded preponderance of autocracy. This
method should provide a more realistic assessment of the democratic propensity or the autocratic
leaning per state throughout the first half of the 19th century (since 1820) until 2007. Democracy
is a political system that entails a process of long-term series of institutional changes that a given
state undergoes. Thus, considering individual Polity IV data scores as representing the overall
variation in the level of democracy may hinder the complexity behind the phenomena of
democratization and subsequent democratic consolidation (or conversely “autocratization” and
subsequent autocratic consolidation). Also, this method (of considering the total sum of scores per
state) preserves all 21 possibilities that the original coding of Polity IV promises (going from -10
to +10 and including a score of 0)95.
The second independent variable that is included in the models is per capita GDP. This
variable measures the ‘wealth of nations’ (Smith 1977). The data are borrowed from the Maddison
Project (Maddison 2008; Bolt et al. 2014). The data itself measures the dollar amount of the yearly
wealth produced by the state on the territory of the state divided by the total population. The
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Note that the nuance integral to Polity IV coding, which relates to the 21 possibilities in terms of regime scores, is
preserved throughout Chapters Four, Five, and Six.
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variable per capita GDP has a nominal base in Geary-Khamis dollars96. The data on per capita
GDP is logged and lagged by one year. Logging helps to normalize (to an extent) the distribution
of data points of per capita GDP while lagging this variable by one year helps to alleviate
endogeneity. This variable is disaggregated into two ranges of values. The first division
distinguishes high per capita GDP values by exclusively focusing on the 75th percentile and above,
while the second division accounts for states that are at the 25th percentile or below. The former
threshold should represent wealthy nations while the second represents poor nations. Again, it is
argued here that values around the median (or the 50th percentile), while more representative of
the overall distribution, do not provide a clear demarcation between rich and poor economies.
Thus, this threshold should reliably reflect the intended variation in the wealth of nations.
GDP growth is the third and final explanatory variable that is included97. The data for this
variable is found in the Maddison Project (Maddison 2008; Bolt et al.2014). These data, similar to
per capita GDP, has as a nominal base in the Geary-Khamis hypothetical dollar currency. The
variable GDP growth is logged and lagged by one year for the reasons mentioned earlier. As
explained in the theory section, GDP growth is often used as a proxy measure for unemployment.
So, in order to differentiate between states that are economically prosperous and those that
experience lower levels of economic growth throughout the sample, a disaggregation or split in
the data is made at the 75th and 25th percentile. Again, this should give way to a clear distinction
between states that are in the 75th percentile and above and those are at lower levels of economic
growth, or at the 25th percentile and below.
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Geary-Khamis is a hypothetical currency that helps to alleviate wide disparities in amounts of dollars by normalizing
(to an extent) differences in purchasing power across states (Bolt et al. 2014).
97
Note that per capita GDP and GDP growth only correlate 32% of the time throughout the sample.
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6.4. Consolidation Against Civil War: Methods
In this Chapter a change-point analysis on the frequency of civil war throughout time and
space is operationalized. The change-point modeling is a subtype of Bayesian analysis, derived
from the Bayes rule or theorem. This theorem helps to compute a probability of an event given the
probability of a related event, such as the past frequency of its occurrence for instance. The
probability of a related event is based on prior information that we have of that event, which can
be denoted as 𝑦(Thomson 2014, 3). Thus, the probability that ascribes to the Bayesian philosophy
can be represented below as:
𝑝(𝜃|𝛾) =

𝑝(𝜃|𝑦)𝑝(𝜃)
𝑝(𝑦)

Whereby parameter 𝜃(theta)represents the prior distribution, and the probability 𝑝(𝜃|𝛾)
represents what is referred to as the posterior distribution (Thompson 2014, 3). By including the
predicted probability distribution 𝑦 ∗ (or posterior likelihood distribution) we can write:
𝑝(𝑦 ∗ |𝑦) = ∫ 𝑝(𝑦 ∗ |𝜃)𝑝(𝜃|𝑦)𝑑𝜃
Whereby the predicted probability of event𝑝(𝑦 ∗ |𝑦) denotes the posterior likelihood distribution
given the past set of data y, which derives from the primitive function of the predictive probability
given the parameter of the prior𝜃, multiplied by the probability of the distribution of the prior
given the past set of data y, overall multiplied by the distribution of the prior98. It is important to
underline that the core function of Bayesian analysis is the integral, or the primitive. Put otherwise,
Bayesian analysis calculates a probability, as a result of tracing the geometric area through which
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Note that it is the researcher who choses and sets the prior distribution a certain way. In the case of this paper, since
the data is in count, we have two main options when it comes to prior distribution. First is what is referred to as a flat
prior of both means before and after the change point (explained later) and of the change point itself or a uniform prior
(with two set parameters more than often representing a mean of zero and a variance of one (Thomson 2014) of both
means before and after the change point.
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the posterior likelihood spatially overlaps with the likelihood of the set of data y times the
probability distribution of the prior 𝜃.Thus, even in the case of Poisson regressions99 on yearly
civil war counts through change-point analysis, it remains a question of posterior probability. In
Bayesian analysis, the posterior distribution is the key parameter of interest.
This method could be applied to numerous different research questions that are posed in
the literature within the discipline of political science100. Conventional frequentist statistics such
as logistic regressions, whereby the key outcome, or the probability of a civil war occurrence for
example, is conditional upon reproducing the same sample indefinitely in order to get a confidence
interval. On the other hand, Bayesian modeling computes a posterior distribution given how
informative or uninformative are a set of data y and distribution of prior 𝜃. In the former case of
conventional statistics, we are essentially asking reality to remain unchanged and to be replicated
indefinitely so we can deduce results that are conclusive or within the 95% interval. The ‘empirical
realism’—to borrow from Svolik (2015,717)—that Bayesian models portray, lies in the fact that
past reality, which can only occur once, is able to determine future predictions.
More specifically, the results of this section were generated after utilizing Poisson
regressions and running the set of data through Monte Carlo Markov Chain (mcmc) simulation,
which is a probabilistic model that runs numerous trials assuming a random distribution in the set
of data y, or more precisely the aggregate yearly civil war count. The below probability of
delineating a y number of civil wars given their past frequency can be written as:

99

The test of overdispersion showed that that overdispersion was not statistically different from 1, thus Poisson
regressions were used in the models. Note that the mean count of civil wars is around 1 and the variance around 3.
100
For more works that utilize Bayesian models in political science, see (Hays et al. 2003; Spirling 2007; Park 2010;
Svolik 2015). Note that the aforementioned works use much more sophisticated techniques such as Gibbs sampling
method for achieving higher efficiency in the iterations inter alia, and so forth. This study is merely a modest
contribution to the literature by introducing Bayesian analysis to future civil war studies.
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𝜆𝑦 𝑒 −𝜆
𝑝(𝑦|𝜆) = 
𝑦! (𝑒 −𝜆 )

Whereby the number of civil war y can be anywhere between 0 and 10, the frequency of civil war
or 𝜆 can be anywhere between 0 and 188, meaning that every year will be a year of civil war. Thus,
the probability of civil war, given its frequency, should equal to the rate of civil war to the exponent
civil war count times the exponential function of negative𝜆 (or the exponential function of 𝜆1/2
over the permutation of civil war count (from 10 to 1) times the exponential function of 𝜆1/2. Thus,
the equation also equals the rate of civil war to the exponent “y” over “y!”, or the permutation of
y.
The above equation can help justify why change-point models were used. Change-point
models, although highly computation-intensive (through iterations), are extremely easy to explain
and interpret. Change-point models generate a point in time (here in years) during which a clear
pattern of civil war count was reversed, going from an increase to a decrease or vice versa. Looking
at the data between 1820 and 2007 makes discerning this pattern impossible to the naked eye.
Thus, the only purpose of change-point models is that it generates a clear pattern in the evolution
of count data points whereby a significant change in count of civil wars is noted during a specific
point in time. This method essentially splits the data into two nodes, referred to as mu1 and mu2
thereafter. The change-point value, referred to as cp thereafter, always falls between mu1 and mu2.
Simply put, both mu1 and mu2 represent the mean values before and after the split at the cp value,
respectively. Below is the relation between the probabilities of civil war occurrence, given its
frequency over time𝑝(𝑦|𝜆), mu1 (𝜇1 ) and mu2 (𝜇2 ):
𝜇1
≥ 1; 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑝(𝑦|𝜆)𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠0
𝜇2
𝑝(𝑦|𝜆):{𝜇
1
≤ 1; 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑝(𝑦|𝜆)𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠1
𝜇2
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Given the set of data and the operationalization of the variables outlined in Section 6.3, the
results should be indicative of a pattern whereby states that have had a high autocratic propensity
since their formation, have been the poorest, and/or have faced low levels of economic growth fail
to consolidate against civil war, relative to their antipodal counterparts.
6.5. Consolidation against Civil War: Results
Table 6.1: Aggregate Count of Civil War between 1820 and 2007101 (Model One)

mu1
Change-Point
mu2

Mean
.8417249
1959.707
2.747607

Std. Dev.
.0761246
2.010102
.2443122

MCSE Median
.002741 .840038
.064942 1960.136
.013904 2.744085

Posterior summary statistics

[95% Cred. Interval]
.6909503 .9986479
1955.059 1962.798
2.27107 3.283726
MCMC sample size =

10,000

Ratio: {mu1}/ {mu2}
Mean

Std. Dev.

MCSE

Median

[95% Cred. Interval]

Ratio102

.0385841

.001601 .3064301

.2391549 .3902686

.3086869

Model 1 (Table 6.1) tells us that the world has become more civil war-prone after 1959,
relative to before that date103. In fact, the world, on average, experienced .84 civil wars per year
before 1959, in contrast with 2.74 civil wars per year post-1959. Thus, after 1959, the mean number
of aggregate civil wars increased by a factor of approximately 3.24 (or the inverse of the ratio
{mu1/mu2104}). Several factors may explain this decisive increase in the frequency of civil wars
fought since the late 1950s: first, one should relativize by noting that the 20th century has witnessed
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Diagnostics of all seven models can be found in Appendix C.
Note that the results of the ratio {mu1/mu2} are not a simple result of mu1 over mu2 as they take into account
multiple other parameters such as the standard deviations of both mu1 mu2 and the cp value, the MCSE (or the Monte
Carlo Standard Error) and how wide are the 95% credible intervals.
103
Note that this increase in number of civil wars can be attributed to things such as the formation of new states, wars
of independence (Venezuelan independence in the 1840s, Algerian independence in the early 1960s, to name only
two), and so forth.
104
Note that the value of MCSE gauges the extent to which the posterior mean value (post-1959 or after the changepoint value) is precise (Marchenko 2015). Therefore, the more the MCSE tends to zero, the more reliable is the
posterior prediction of increase (or decrease) in civil war counts.
102

80

the formation of multiple new states. The African continent in the 1960s and more specifically the
wave of decolonization of African states in the 1960s (which are considered in this study as
episodes of civil war) can aptly serve as an illustration to the formation of new states, and a fortiori
an increase in civil war likelihood over time. Thus, almost mechanically, the likelihood and
subsequently the number of civil wars fought potentially increase. Moreover, this rise in the
number of civil wars fought can be explained by the war dynamic of the Cold War, which did not
militarily and frontally oppose the United States to the Soviet Union, but rather exacerbated proxy
wars that were typically civil wars (Cambodia 1967-75 or Vietnam 1955-1975, among others).
The increase in the number of civil wars fought (table 6.1) appears to be supported by a relatively
small credible interval of years [1955; 1962]. Consequently, one can posit that any of the
explanatory variables that actually decreases the mean number of civil wars after a given changepoint value essentially resists the overall world trend of increase in civil war count. As a result of
resisting or even counteracting this overarching increasing trend of civil war count over time, this
explanatory variable should provide sufficiently strong evidence of its importance in terms of
having an impact on predicting future civil war counts. In other words, the predictive power of this
variable would not be dependent upon or associated with the passing of time, which can be referred
to as time dependency, but instead would have a unique and ad hoc reason for decreasing the
number of civil war counts as time goes by.
Table 6.2: History of Democratic Propensity105 (Model Two)
Mean
mu1
1089797
Change-Point 1943.191
mu2
.6820101
Posterior summary statistics

Std. Dev.
.0290751
3.963758
.1030151

MCSE Median
.00125 .1061621
.149003 1943.233
.005626 .6800768

Ratio: {mu1}/ {mu2}

105

The sum of polity scores per state is overall positive.
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[95% Cred. Interval]
.0594852 .1736347
1934.028 1949.902
.4918572 .9037547
MCMC sample size = 10,000

Mean
.1635815

Ratio

Std. Dev.
.0507891

MCSE Median
.002635 .1576031

[95% Cred. Interval]
.0839838 .2773234

The second disaggregation in the data is made between states that have, more often than
not, been democratic106. Looking at the results in Table 6.2, the cp is year 1943. This means that a
clear and decisive change in the pattern of civil war count occurred during the early 1940s in states
with democratic propensity. If we look closely at the ratio of {mu/mu2}, we also note an increase
in civil war count post-1943, relative to before that date. In fact, the results suggest that civil wars
increased by a factor of approximately 6.25 between 1943 and 1950 when compared to the period
of time between 1934 and 1942. The credible interval [1934; 1950] is relatively small, which is
well supported by a small MCSE in that it is close to zero (.002635). Nonetheless, sets of interval
hypothesis testing were run in order to measure, based upon increased probabilities of civil war
occurrence (as the ratio is less than one), which specific years were most prevalent in determining
the posterior likelihood of civil war counts107.
Table 6.3: History of Autocratic Propensity108 (Model Three)
mu1
Change-Point
mu2

Mean
.6808982
1960.461
2.094353

Std. Dev.
.0694552
1.367807
.2151719

MCSE
.002388
.058164
.007537

Median
.6779427
1960.474
2.082153

Posterior summary statistics

MCMC sample size =

Ratio: {mu1}/ {mu2}
Mean

Std. Dev.

MCSE

Ratio

.0484539

.001694 .3245295

.3286462

[95% Cred. Interval]
.5563313 .8254542
1957.651 1963.019
1.704627 2.531568

Median

10,000

[95% Cred. Interval]
.2467777 .4341826

In relation to Model 2, Model 3 indicates that while democratic states, or more precisely
states that have had a historical prevalence of democracy as a regime, experience increasing civil
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Note that all three explanatory variables, polity scores, per capita GDP, and GDP growth were lagged by one year
in order to alleviate (to an extent) problems of endogeneity in the vectors of causality.
107
To see the results, refer to Appendix C.
108
The sum of polity scores per state is overall negative.

82

war counts in the period post-1943, states that have a high autocratic propensity experience
comparatively higher increased rates of civil wars after 1960. In fact, the mean number of civil
wars in states with a high autocratic leaning is approximately .68 per year before 1960 versus
roughly 2.01 after 1960, or a 200% increase, in relative terms. Thus, civil wars in states with a
high autocratic propensity have increased by a factor of 3.04 (or the inverse of the ratio
{mu1/mu2}). Therefore, what can be said is that whether states have had a higher propensity for
democratic versus autocratic types of rule does not appear to matter much with respect to their
consolidation efforts against civil wars. This finding clearly contradicts both the theory on
democratic versus autocratic rule and their respective odds of consolidation against civil war
outlined in Section 3.4 along with Hypothesis 10. More broadly, the same findings put in doubt
the notion that democracies are intrinsically peaceful. In revisiting the main premise of democratic
peace theory, which posits that democracies neither wage war against each other nor against nondemocracies, and in assuming that peace is absolute, meaning that a state experiences both peace
abroad and domestically, it is clear that democratic peace theory is in need of further revision109.
While the results strongly suggest that non-democracies are more susceptible than democracies to
be embroiled in civil wars over time, the same results also strongly imply that peace, or the absence
of civil war, is not innate to the democratic quality of nations.
Models 4 through 7 measure the impact of macro-economic qualities on the consolidation
efforts of states against civil wars. States with high levels of per capita GDP levels seem to have
moved toward consolidation against civil wars since the early 1930s. In fact, before the year 1931,
states that had high levels of per capita GDP were fighting .55 civil wars per year, or a little over
one every two years. After 1931, this number dropped to .10 civil wars per year, the equivalent of
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For more on the “flawed logic of democratic peace theory”, see Rosato (2003).
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one every ten years. The ratio {mu1/mu2} indicates that the overall number of civil wars fought
in high per capita GDP states have decreased by a factor of over 6.
Surprisingly, states that have experienced lower levels of per capita GDP overall seem to
have also moved toward consolidation against the risk of civil war, if we look at the ratio
{mu1/mu2}, which is above one. However, if we look more closely at the standard deviation of
the cp value regarding those same low per capita income earners, and if we also turn our attention
to the credible intervals of that cp value, we can deduce that the results are far from conclusive.
This is unlike the results that describe the consolidation dynamic of states with high per capita
GDP.
Also, assuming that states with low per capita GDP do consolidate over time, it takes them
on average about forty more years to do so than high per capita GDP economies. In fact, while
high per capita GDP economies seemed to decisively consolidate against civil war by 1931, the
same efforts of consolidating against civil war occurred forty years later for low per capita GDP
economies, in 1971. Thus, this forty-year lag is consistent with the theoretical expectation outlined
in Section 3.4; namely, that high levels of wealth decisively help states consolidate against civil
war.
Table 6.4: High Level of Wealth110 (Model Four)
Mean
mu1
.5536223
Change Point 1931.139
mu2
.104305
Posterior summary statistics

Std. Dev.
.0703404
2.536199
.0351087

MCSE Median
.002451 .5486186
.237297 1930.4
.001547 .1008695

Mean

Std. Dev.

MCSE

6.023576

2.56003

.094036 5.387811

[95% Cred. Interval]
.4240187 .7011647
1929.002 1937.704
.0462651 .1799649
MCMC sample size = 10,000

Ratio: {mu1}/ {mu2}

Ratio

110

75th percentile and above within the per capita GDP distribution.
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Median

[95% Cred. Interval]
2.881159 12.54793

Table 6.5: Low Level of Wealth111 (Model Five)
mu1
Change Point
mu2

Mean
.5831128
1971.745
.6157736

Std. Dev.
.0699657
24.47758
.2323711

MCSE
.003168
1.38565
.012949

Median
.5769088
1974.993
.570801

Posterior summary statistics
Ratio: {mu1}/ {mu2}
Mean
Ratio

1.100155

[95% Cred. Interval]
.464114 .7456413
1934.603 2006.195
.2735691 1.253079
MCMC sample size =

Std. Dev.

MCSE

.5040108

Median

10,000

[95% Cred. Interval]

.03739 1.014374

.4465738 2.242638

Table 6.6: High Level of Economic Development112 (Model Six)

mu1
Change Point
mu2

Mean
.6060987
1948.813
.5307484

Std. Dev.
.0812929
31.84656
.1560064

MCSE Median
.002958 .6008064
2.17791 1935.991
.013214 .4985709

Posterior summary statistics
Ratio: {mu1}/ {mu2}
Mean
Ratio

1.243634

[95% Cred. Interval]
.4646534 .783857
1902.491 2005.14
.3149941 .9297699
MCMC sample size =

Std. Dev.

MCSE

Median

.4063719

.024409 1.228733

10,000

[95% Cred. Interval]
.5721428

2.07353

Table 6.7: Low Level of Economic Development113 (Model Seven)

mu1
Change Point
mu2

Mean
.0742707
1957.223
.8278403

Std. Dev.
.0234218
3.785826
.1328427

MCSE
.001137
.230447
.005077

Median
.0726553
1957.546
.8214509

Posterior summary statistics

MCMC sample size =

Ratio: {mu1}/ {mu2}
Mean

Std. Dev.

Ratio

.0329435

.0918956

[95% Cred. Interval]
.0352812 .125467
1946.626 1962.741
.5886694 1.093956

MCSE

Median

.001444 .0884596

111

25th percentile and below within the per capita GDP distribution.
75th percentile and above within the GDP growth distribution.
113
25th percentile and below within the GDP growth distribution.
112
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10,000

[95% Cred. Interval]
.0426067 .1665183

We now assess the impact of economic growth on a state’s consolidation efforts against
civil war. Relative to the results of Models Two through Five, the findings in Models Six and
Seven are weaker and not as conclusive. This is mainly due to the large credible intervals upon
which the prediction of consolidation or non-consolidation against civil war is conditioned.
Nonetheless, Model Six clearly suggests that economies that have experienced robust and high
GDP growth rates seem to have move toward consolidation against civil wars in the late 1940s, or
1948 to be exact. In fact, while there were about .64 civil wars fought yearly, on average, before
1948, versus .53 civil wars fought yearly, on average, post-1948. This marginal difference does
not allow for a conclusive and decisive change in the efforts of states with high economic growth
to consolidate against civil wars, as time goes by. Moreover, the strength of this prediction is highly
mitigated by the large credible intervals within which the cp value situates itself. The credible
intervals indicate that the overall decrease in the number of civil wars fought in states that
experience high yearly GDP growth rates could have occurred anywhere between 1902 and
2005114. Evidently, this indicator does not give us clear and concise information on the exact timing
of consolidation against civil war. This is why interval hypothesis testing was run in order to
examine the importance of specific years during which the consolidation against civil war was
most pronounced (See Appendix C).
Nonetheless, and in contrast to states experiencing high levels of economic growth rates,
the results in Model Seven clearly suggest that states facing low economic growth rates appear to
be much more vulnerable to civil war as time goes by, especially after 1957. In fact, prior to that
year, low-income growth states fought on, average, 0.07 civil wars per year. After 1957, civil wars
became much more prevalent in those same states, averaging 0.82 per year, an increase by a factor
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Also, the graphical output in Appendix C (Figure C.8) suggests that high levels of economic growth are not strong
predictors of consolidation or (de)consolidation against civil wars.

86

greater than 10. This result or this positive change in civil war frequency to which states with low
levels of economic development are exposed is strongly supported by a relatively low MCSE of
0.0014 and a relatively narrow credible interval [1946; 1962]. Meaning that the true value of the
cp situates itself anywhere between 1946 and 1962, inclusive.
6.6. Conclusion
The results of this chapter provide three main implications for future work on civil wars.
First, while non-democracies are dangerously exposed to civil war as time goes by, especially
since the early 1960s onward, democracies, despite being less exposed to civil war115, especially
since the early 1940s onward, are nonetheless far from being immune to civil wars. The relation
between peace and democratic propensity needs refinement. The concept of peace should be
conceived of in absolute terms. In other words, a state either experiences peace internationally and
at home, or else it is not at peace but at war. In fact, consolidated democracies (per Polity) have
fought bloody civil wars in periods during which they enjoyed high democratic scores (+8 and
above), (The United States, The United Kingdom, France, Greece, Spain, Costa Rica to name a
few). Thus, the first concrete implication for future works on civil war is that peace, or the absence
of civil war, constitutes neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for democratic consolidation
unless we are to assume that the aforementioned cases are not consolidated democracies, which is
more than a challenging thesis to defend. The second implication for future work on civil wars is
that the wealth of nations, in this case measured by per capita GDP, is an extremely powerful
predictor of the efforts of states to decisively move toward consolidation against civil wars. Simply
put, high per capita GDP has decreased the frequency of civil wars, especially since the late 1920s
(1929) and early 1930s onward. Finally, in a world where states on average are dramatically more

115

Relative to non-democracies.

87

exposed to civil wars, those experiencing low levels of economic development are perilously
exposed to civil wars, even more so since the late 1950s.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
An emerging part of the literature on civil war has corrected for the pitfalls of previous
designs by disaggregating civil wars into different types. The type of civil war becomes a function
of (1) the grievances because of which types of civil war erupt, namely ethnic or non-ethnic civil
wars (Cederman et al. 2013; Gurses 2015), or (2) can be related to how civil wars are fought
(Kalyvas et al. 2010; Balcells et al. 2014). This study ascribes to the latter logic in that it builds its
theoretical framework116 on the premise that distinguishing between civil war types as a function
of how they are fought is pertinent and empirically valid. One of the merits of such an approach is
that the empirical validity insofar as we can identify the mode of fighting a civil war is evident:
every civil war implies that conflict will take hold, and the weaponry will either make the warring
actors (the incumbent state and the insurgent) fight on equal footing or position one actor at a
disadvantage relative to the other, there are no other outcomes in terms of power dynamics between
the warring actors; which makes deriving inferences plausible. In contrast, putting in perspective
ethnic (or otherwise) grievances for which actors participate in conflict is overambitious, namely
because it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to clearly isolate and subsequently categorize
the grievances of each warring actor as purely ethnic-related or otherwise.
Summary of the Findings
Chapter Four assesses the extent to which states can be exposed to the risk of civil war.
Analyzing the risk exposure to civil war, as opposed to studying the causes of civil war, allows for
an empirically realist assessment as it is suggested that studying the causes of civil war is similar
to opening the Pandora’s Box of epistemological measurement error. This is because civil wars
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Chapter six conflates all types of civil war together; the reason for such an initiative was amply explained.
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are complex and that reducing their onset to a few covariates117 as the root causes can present an
epistemological hazard. A cause differs from an exposure in that the former has an original (in the
strict sense of the word) impact on the phenomenon while the latter has a subsequent impact on
that same phenomenon. Subsequently, economic growth, whether positive or negative, does not
cause civil war; it causes variation in the level of wealth that is produced by an economy. However,
we can say that declining per capita GDP can increase the risk exposure to civil wars. That is to
say that it may be useful for future works on civil war to correct for the aforementioned
epistemological fallacy by examining the risk exposure to civil war rather than its ‘root’ causes.
The results of Chapter Four support the need for future work on civil war, namely that the
same covariates may have an impact on a specific type of civil war while failing to explain the
varying degrees of exposure states have to another type of civil war. In fact, while a militarized
executive in a given state increases the hazards associated with the exposure to irregular civil war,
it fails to explain the risk exposure to either conventional or symmetrical nonconventional warfare.
Additionally, while per capita GDP decreases the hazards associated with the risk exposure to
irregular civil war, it fails to explain the risk exposure to either conventional or symmetrical
nonconventional warfare118. In concordance with the literature, an increasing rural population
significantly explains the increased hazards associated with irregular119 civil wars (Gall 1965;
Buhang et al. 2002; Kalyvas 2001; 2006; Holliday 2013; Bueno de Mesquita 2013). Additionally,
while high religious fractionalization exposes autocratic states to conventional civil war, it fails to
explain variation in the hazards associated with both irregular and symmetrical nonconventional
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One can conceive of civil wars as having a number of causes potentially in the hundreds, which materialize on
multiple and diverse levels of analysis, ranging from the international to the neighborhood level.
118
This finding is robust to alternative models such as Rare-Events Logistic regressions (See Appendix A).
119
With the exception of Kalyvas (2001; 2006), there is no mention of the word ‘irregular’ in those aforementioned
works, however the logic they lay out- in terms of asymmetry in power between the incumbent sate and the insurgentmatches the theoretical and empirical expectations that we find in this paper, regarding rural population.
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warfare. Finally, high ethnic fractionalization in autocratic states makes those states vulnerable
only to symmetrical nonconventional civil wars.
Chapter Five puts into perspective civil war violence committed against both combatant
(or battle-related victims) and civilian units, the former representing overall battlefield lethality on
a macro-level while the violence perpetrated strictly against civilians is likely to constitute overall
civilian victimization outside of the battlefield on a micro-level. The results in Chapter Five clearly
suggest that conventional civil wars are, on average, most lethal on the battlefield, relative to
irregular and symmetrical nonconventional (the least violent form of warfare) civil wars. However,
the pattern to the variation of battlefield lethality when conventional civil wars are fought does not
appear to be systematic. In fact, the lack of significance in all of the estimated models suggests120
more relevant covariates need to be introduced in future studies of civil war violence. On the other
hand, the results are stronger when the level of violence in symmetrical nonconventional civil wars
is in relation to irregular civil wars. In fact, the latter form of warfare is much deadlier than the
former for both combatants and civilians alike, on the battlefield. Looking at the level of violence
perpetrated strictly against civilians, irregular civil wars are clearly the most lethal form of warfare,
relative to the two other civil war types. This finding, robust to the inclusion of other covariate
estimates and to alternative model specifications, supports the notion that there needs to be a global
urgency with regard to ending civil wars, specifically irregular civil wars, given that the number
of civilian deaths is much greater, relative to both conventional and symmetrical nonconventional
warfare.
Moreover, higher polity scores along with higher levels of GDP growth are strongly
associated with an overall decrease in the level of battlefield lethality. This finding is also robust
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This insignificance is robust to alternative model specification and to the inclusion of the duration of conflict, which
is assumed to be associated with the level of violence.
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to alternative model specifications and to the inclusion of multiple other covariates. From that
inference can be generated interactive terms between polity scores (and GDP growth levels) and
the type of civil war being fought. This should explain which type of violence in which type of
civil war, whether on or outside the battlefield, is sensitive to the variation in polity scores and
GDP growth levels.
Also, higher ethnic fractionalization indices strongly decrease the level of overall
violence, both on the battlefield and against civilians. As such, mountainous terrain is not a strong
predictor of either increasing or decreasing levels of overall violence, and whether violence occurs
on the battlefield or against civilians.
This study also stressed the importance of identifying tactics that are typically at the
disposal of both warring actors whenever civil wars are fought; tactics that are concomitant with
the use of weaponry. The framework related to tactical choice that this work designed should
provide a template (in need of further refinement) for future works on civil war that ascribe to the
theoretical and consequently the empirical distinction made between the war dynamics of
conventional, irregular, and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars.
Five tactics presuppose a certain militaristic, logistic, and political weakness of the actor
who uses them: looting, scorched earth tactics, human shields, hostage taking, and kidnapping. In
fact, looting, hostage taking, and kidnapping all suggest that the given actor faces financial trouble,
which can greatly undermine its militaristic power and consequently its legitimate governing
authority. Also, an actor that is forced out of a community or location (by the rival actor) can find
using scorched earth tactics feasible, viable, and even beneficial. Given that an actor has recently
lost control over the region that used to be under its authority, the actor involved is not expected
to offer strong governance or to provide for the community over which it recently ruled, therefore,
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his tactic suggests that the actor aims at making the area it recently fled “uninhabitable” (Schneider
et al. 2012). Moreover, using scorched earth tactics implies that the actor had to flee a certain
region over which it recently controlled, which is symptomatic of militaristic and strategic
weakening. Finally, using human shields implies that the incumbent state has failed to provide
reliable militaristic power to retaliate against the insurgent, or that the insurgents have failed to
consolidate their insurgency against the incumbent state.
On the other hand, other tactics imply strength of one actor, relative to another, in leading
counter-insurgency or insurgency operations whenever the actor is the incumbent state or the
insurgent, respectively. Seven tactics are indicative of such strength: starvation, target
assassination, torture, deportation, disappearances, camps, and sieges. In fact, target assassination,
along with deportation, disappearances, and torture imply that the actor who uses them enjoy high
quality information on ‘where to strike’. Unlike kidnapping for instance, which is deemed in this
study to target civilians indiscriminately, the aforementioned tactics aim at neutralizing specific
targets. Thus, the presupposition here is that the actor had to collaborate (at least to an extent) with
some of the civilian population in order to gather reliable and quality information to support its
counter-insurgency (or insurgency) operations. Likewise, camps and sieges entail a high
concentration of military checkpoints (whether the incumbent state’s or the insurgent’s) within
and at the outskirts of the region over which the given actor claims control, to the point where
imposing sieges and camps become feasible and sustainable. Thus, one of the contributions of this
work is to have designed a framework whereby tactical choice, relative to specific weaponry use,
helps in identifying and contextualizing the asymmetry in power (or lack thereof) between the
incumbent state and the insurgent, consequently allowing for a categorization of a given civil war
as conventional, irregular, or symmetrical nonconventional. Note that such tactics can be the object
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of future studies on civil war but also interstate wars. The purpose to identify tactics used by
warring actors confronting each other militarily would be to categorize inter-state wars as being
fought in a way whereby asymmetry in power between the warring actors can be discerned and
analyzed. In fact, tactics in a context of inter-state war that opposes (at least) two states or
sovereign entities date back to at least the 15th century121.
Chapter Six departs from conventional frequentist models in order to offer a novel
statistical model that has grown increasingly popular within the subfield of political science.
Derived from Bayesian analysis, the results of Chapter Six rely upon a change-point analysis
whereby it examines the efforts of states to consolidate against civil war regardless of the type of
civil war during a specific period in their history. Identifying clear turning points in time, or what
is referred to as change-point values, makes inferences possible as far as whether states are moving
toward or away from consolidation against civil wars. Consolidation against civil war is a function
of a decisive decrease in the frequency of civil wars fought over time. Whenever values postchange point (mu2) are greater than values pre-change point (mu1), moving away from
consolidation against civil war becomes the likely scenario122. The results indicate that in a world
that has become increasingly civil war prone, especially since the early 1960s, states that have had
a higher democratic propensity are less prone to civil wars than states that have adopted autocratic
rule.
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One can think of tactics portraying indirect attacks such as the cabalgadas; aimed at destroying the harvest in
Grenada under Islamic rule of the pre-1492 period. The Spanish armadas- of Ferdinand the Catholic- carried out such
tactics leading, inter alia, to the Reconquista of Grenada in 1492 (Braudel 1996). Such tactics may have implied a
relative incapability of the Spanish Armadas to directly confront Islamic Grenada; thus the reliance on the
aforementioned indirect tactics of attacks. That is to say that the framework of tactics designed in this paper might not
be limited to the power dynamics within civil wars alone.
122
The exact opposite inequality (between mu1 and mu2) demonstrates that states are moving toward consolidation
against civil wars.
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Although weaker overall, the results regarding the levels of yearly economic growth,
suggest that economies, which have experienced a robust and sustained increase in their yearly
economic growth levels, have moved toward consolidation against civil wars beginning in the late
1940s. In contrast, states with low levels of economic growth have moved away from consolidation
against civil war, especially since the late 1950s. Finally, the strongest results concern the variation
in yearly per capita GDP levels. Those results confirm that wealthy states decisively moved toward
consolidation against civil war from 1929 onward. Likewise, although overall less decisive in their
move toward consolidation were poor states, which have arguably also moved toward
consolidation against civil war much later (in the early 1970s). Thus, poor states appear to lag
behind wealthy states in their respective efforts to decisively consolidate against civil war by
approximately forty years. Overall, the strongest findings relate to the quality of being a wealthy
state. The implication for future works on civil war, whether regarding the exposure to civil war
or the consolidation against civil war, is that it is important to account for the wealth of nations,
whether using per capita GDP or another measure of wealth. Chapter Six modestly paves the way
for a new avenue of research design in civil war studies, one where the philosophy of research,
through Bayesian modeling, looks at history in order to determine the future, unlike conventional
methods whereby the past is asked to be reproduced indefinitely in order to establish a 95%
confidence interval. The empirical realism that Bayesian analysis promises is one of the its many
merits, consequently providing an exciting new instrument at the disposal of future research in
political science, and on civil war.
Limitations
There are limitations within this thesis that need to be addressed. Those limitations are
enumerated following the order of the Chapters. Regarding Chapter Four, given that symmetrical
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nonconventional civil wars only represent 17 cases, the results that derive from the latter model
must remain tentative123. When it comes to Chapter Five, the main limitation lies in the unverified
assumption that the area of the battlefield and the areas with high civilian inhabitance do not
spatially overlap. In fact, if that assumption does not hold, then the results that distinguish between
civilian and battle-related deaths would need to be revisited124. Further, the covariate estimates for
per capita GDP and for Polity IV scores, albeit significant when predicting an overall decrease in
the number of battle-related deaths (Model 5.1), infer that there is no lagged posterior effect on the
decrease of battle-related deaths. Evidently, this assumption can be put in doubt and future works
need to design variables that gauge a certain lagged posterior effect for covariates such as per
capita GDP and polity scores when it comes to assessing their real impact on decreasing the degree
of battlefield lethality in a civil war context.
Finally, the results of Chapter Six only take into account whether the state in question has
had a clear democratic propensity versus autocratic leaning throughout its history, whether the
state is rich or poor, and whether that state has experienced periods of economic prosperity or
recession (or economic stagnation). That is to say that the models did not account for several
important control variables, namely the increasing number of states formed between the 1820s and
2007, the time elapsed between state formation and the first civil war, or whether the state itself
experienced civil war for the first time or relapsed into civil war (in which case becoming a civil
war recidivist) throughout its history. Also, another limitation relates to the choice of changepoint models used. In fact, other change-point models, based upon logit or probit functions,

123

Although rare event logistic regressions were run in order to correct (to an extent) for standard logit estimates.
Although the number of casualties significantly differs between those that succumbed on the battlefield and those
outside of the battlefield, which can provide reasonable and preliminary (albeit unverified) support to the assumption
that the areas of the battlefield and those outside of the battlefield typically do not spatially overlap.
124
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directly generate probabilities of consolidation against civil war, which may arguably be more
efficient than measuring a decisive increase or decline in the frequency of civil wars over time.
Remarks on Prospective Research
The literature on civil war has recently adhered to the logic of disaggregation of civil war
into different types; here it is observed as a function of the mode of fighting over the course of a
civil war. Whether theoretically or empirically, this disaggregation is warranted, given the
variation in the results predicting either the differential risk exposure to each type of civil war, or
the differential level of violence unique to each type of civil war. Thus, moving forward, it seems
fair to suggest that future quantitative work on civil war that chooses to aggregate all civil wars
into one need to offer a convincing theoretical framework to support such an initiative. In a world
where the frequency of civil wars is increasing (Dertwinkel 2009), it is crucial for future research
to identify and subsequently categorize civil wars as being fought in conventional, irregular, or
symmetrical nonconventional mode. Of course, other categories can be theorized, such as civil
wars fought for independence (Algeria in the period 1954-1962) or civil wars preceding secession
(Bangladesh in 1971). Thus, there is room for future research to associate the war dynamics, which
have been the primary focus of this paper, with the political dynamics in the context of civil war.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Exposure to Civil War
43 subjects were dropped from the study because of missing data or because they represent
micro-sates with less than 500, 0000 inhabitants (The World fact book, CIA 2008). Below is the
exhaustive alphabetical enumeration of such observations:
Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia, Brunei, Cape Verde,
Comoros, Cyprus, Dominica, East Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji,
Guinea, Grenada, Guyana, Iceland, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands
Monaco, Nauru, North Vietnam (1945-1976), Oman, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tomé-etPrincipe, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San
Marino, Seychelles, Serbia, South Sudan, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

Appendix A.1: States outside of Asia that are neither new (formed post-1964) nor civil war
recidivists125
Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the
Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Angola.
Appendix A.2: Dealing with Missing Data
Variable
Incumbent
Consolidation
Military

Obs=Missing
43
24

Obs>Missing

Obs< Missing
7,519

Obs<Missing
Unique Values
2

Min
0

2

0

7,538

Max
1
1

Above is the summary of missing data found in the overall sample. All the other variables
have data available. It is important to mention, however, that originally GDP per capita, GDP
growth, and the rural population all had missing data. Since the aforementioned variables had
missing observations when first entering the panel (or year 1946), interpolation of data was made
between the first year in which data existed and the year 1946. The most interpolation made was
in the case of the rural population variable, which replaced missing values in the entry year by

125

According to the coding of civil war that the Correlates of War provides.
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available values in year _n+4. Although the rural population variable, similarly to per capita GDP
or GDP growth, experiences yearly within variation, the assumption here is that interpolating made
not only regeneration of (otherwise) missing data possible, but it also remained genuinely
representative of the clear visible pattern in the variation of the aforementioned variables.
Appendix A.3: Assessing Proportionality in Hazards Estimates
Below are the statistical tests of proportionality that helped to detect violations in the
proportionality on hazards estimates, which is integral to the Cox parameterization assumption126.
Table A.4: All Civil Wars-Test of Proportional Hazards Assumption

Incumbent Consolidation
Military as Executive
Per Capita GDP
Yearly GDP Growth
Polity
Ethnic Frac.
Religious Frac.
Polity* High Ethnic Frac.
Polity* High Religious Frac.
Rough Terrain
Rural Population
New State (formed Post-1964)
Civil War Recidivist
Sub-Saharan Africa
MENA
Latin America
Asia
global test

rho
-0.11917
0.11593
-0.13524
0.14084
-0.05091
0.33012
-0.26798
-0.10532
0.17756
0.13813
-0.13912
0.18229
-0.02245
-0.21764
-0.25127
-0.3078
-0.26222

chi2
2.79
3.27
20.25
22.63
0.81
39.84
26.53
4.04
11.87
4.89
21.44
23.2
0.2
20.84
30.42
39.38
41.35
82.78

126

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
17

Prob>chi2
0.0950
0.0706
0.0000
0.0000
0.3677
0.0000
0.0000
0.0446
0.0006
0.0270
0.0000
0.0000
0.6578
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Interaction terms were generated between the log units of time and the covariate of which the chi-squared value
was significant at least at the .05 level. The estat phtest command in STATA was used for the first set of regressions
(all civil wars conflated together or model 1 in table 4.6). The option tvc (or time-varying covariates) was used in
STATA in order to detect the violation of covariates (estimated through competing risk regressions) of the proportional
hazards assumption in the following tables below (or models 2 and 3 in table 4.6). Note also that the results of the
regressions run on time-varying covariates (using the tvc option) did not converge in model 4, or the model where it
is question of symmetrical nonconventional warfare. Therefore, we detect any violation of the proportionality of
hazards assumption in the symmetrical nonconventional warfare model (or model 4) using the estat phtest command
in STATA.
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Table A.5: Conventional Warfare-Test of Proportional Hazards Assumption
tvc

Coef.

Robust St. Error

z

P>| z |

Incumbent Consolidation
Military as Executive

0.0057227
-0.0114327

0.0540158
0.0239193

0.11
-0.48

0.916
0.633

Per Capita GDP
Yearly GDP Growth

-0.0406742
0.0261122

0.0133762
0.0146984

-3.04
1.78

0.002
0.076

Ethnic Frac.
Religious Frac.

0.1263136
-0.0359086

0.0582831
0.0502904

2.17
-0.71

0.030
0.475

Polity
Polity* High Ethnic Frac.

0.0026971
-0.0019181

0.0043445
0.0079884

0.62
-0.24

0.535
0.810

Polity* High Religious Frac.
Rough Terrain

-0.0053339
0.0026095

0.0080086
0.0083371

-0.67
0.31

0.505
0.754

Rural Population
New State (formed Post-1964)

-0.0408313
0.0250004

0.0167168
0.0203759

-2.44
1.23

0.015
0.220

Civil War Recidivist (since 1900)
Sub-Sharan Africa

0.0284043
-0.0616986

0.0299686
0.0410485

0.95
-1.50

0.343
0.133

MENA
Latin America

-0.0844139
-0.3055311

0.0364351
0.0830734

-2.32
-3.68

0.021
0.000

Asia

-0.0575364

0.0456088

-1.26

0.207

Note: 95% Credible Intervals were intentionally removed in order to preserve the graphical clarity.

Table A.6: Irregular Warfare- Test of Proportional Hazards Assumption
tvc
Incumbent Consolidation
Military as Executive
Per Capita GDP
Yearly GDP Growth
Ethnic Frac.
Religious Frac.
Polity
Polity* High Ethnic Frac.
Polity* High Religious Frac.
Rough Terrain

Coef.

Robust St. Error

z

P>| z |

0.0031275

0.0241783

0.13

0.8970

-0.008854

0.0309086

-0.29

0.7750

0.0363575

0.0285261

1.27

0.2020

-0.0002594

0.0186299

-0.01

0.9890

0.0060661

0.0351075

0.17

0.8630

-0.0909018

0.0526098

-1.73

0.0840

0.002101

0.0039152

0.54

0.5920

-0.0047985

0.0063273

-0.76

0.4480

0.0063677

0.0098965

0.64

0.5200

-0.0038411

0.0076121

-0.5

0.6140

Rural Population

0.0090418

0.0172528

0.52

0.6000

New State (formed Post-1964)

0.0254438

0.0341651

0.74

0.4560

Civil War Recidivist (since 1900)

0.0044131

0.0285311

0.15

0.8770

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.0596375

0.0875429

0.68

0.4960

MENA

0.0013155

0.0878746

0.01

0.9880

-0.0202261

0.0879392

-0.23

0.8180

-0.014154

0.0876763

-0.16

0.8720

Latin America
Asia

Note: 95% Credible Intervals were intentionally removed in order to preserve the graphical clarity.
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Table A.7: Symmetrical Nonconventional Warfare- Test of Proportional Hazards Assumption
rho

chi2

df

Prob>chi2

Incumbent Consolidation

0.02098

0.01

1

0.9310

Military as Executive

-0.12605

0.42

1

0.5194

Per Capita GDP

0.27577

9.99

1

0.0016

Yearly GDP Growth

-0.31591

11.82

1

0.0006

Ethnic Frac.

0.09046

1.18

1

0.2778

Religious Frac.

-0.11694

0.68

1

0.4111

Polity

0.07599

1.16

1

0.2824

Polity* High Ethnic Frac.

0.07941

0.61

1

0.4366

Polity* High Religious Frac.

-0.06405

0.66

1

0.4167

Rough Terrain

0.08277

0.11

1

0.7353

Rural Population

0.20059

6.75

1

0.0094

Sub-Saharan Africa

-0.1792

2.15

1

0.1427

MENA

-0.09364

0.75

1

0.3869

Latin America

0.20934

2.66

1

0.1028

25.58

14

0.0293

global test

Appendix A.8: Graphical Outputs
Below is the graphical output of the hazards, survival, and failure functions, first
considering civil wars as a whole, and then disaggregating them into the three different types.
Figure A.9. Smoothed Hazard Estimate of All Civil Wars
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As one can see from the figure A.9, the hazard estimates, when combining the risk of all
three types of civil wars, is almost linear. Thus, as time increases by one year, the hazards are
expected to increase by approximately one point. After 1991, however, or the end of the Cold War,
the function starts resembling what in economics is known as a diminishing-returns function. One
observation that can be made is that the end of the Cold War ‘pacified’ the world, albeit timidly.
Also, the effect of the Cold War in shaping the dynamics of internal conflict, torn between the
‘liberal’ world and the ‘egalitarian’ mantra, greatly captures the increase in civil war hazards
between 1946 and 1991.
Figure A.10. Smoothed Hazard Estimate per type of Civil War

Figure A.10 disaggregates the hazards into three, those associated with conventional,
irregular, and symmetrical nonconventional civil wars. Between the year 1965 and 1985, the
hazards associated with irregular warfare were significantly greater than those of conventional and
symmetrical nonconventional civil wars. In fact, the hazards of irregular warfare were almost
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100% greater than those of conventional conflict (0.05 versus 0.025 for the former and the latter,
respectively). Another interesting observation is that symmetrical nonconventional civil wars only
appear (decisively)-through their hazards- after 1985. This implies that symmetrical
nonconventional conflict is a relatively new way of waging civil wars, as opposed to the
‘traditional’ irregular and conventional dynamics of warfare.
Figure A.11. Survival Estimates per type of Civil War

Figure A.11 assesses the extent to which states survive, or do not experience civil wars,
per year and per type of civil war. Throughout the years, it seems that conventional civil wars are
the most susceptible to materialize, since over a span of 20 years, the survival estimates of
conventional civil wars is almost half and one-third those of irregular and symmetrical
nonconventional wars, respectively.
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Appendix A.12: Robustness Check of the Results in Table 4.6
Rare-Event Logistic Regressions on the Probabilities of the Occurrence of Conventional, Irregular,
and Symmetrical Nonconventional Civil Wars

Incumbent Consolidation
Military as Executive
Per Capita GDP
Yearly GDP Growth
Ethnic Frac.
Religious Frac.
Polity
Polity* High Ethnic Frac.
Polity* High Religious Frac.
Rough Terrain
Rural Population
New State (formed Post-1964)127
Civil War Recidivist (since 1900)
Sub-Saharan Africa
MENA
Latin America
Asia

Conventional
0.226
(0.58)
0.364
(0.31)
-0.022
(0.68)
-0.081
(0.47)
0.97
(0.74)
1.45
(0.9)
0.024
(0.07)
-0.142
(0.1)
0.171
(0.15)
0.345**
(0.13)
0.029
(0.46)
0.983*
(0.43)
0.23
(0.65)
0.117
(0.75)
0.617
(0.64)
-0.127
(0.85)
0.196
(0.78)

Irregular
0.856
(0.52)
0.781**
(0.27)
-0.759**
(0.24)
0.038
(0.19)
0.898
(0.53)
-0.523
(0.77)
0.026
(0.05)
-0.021
(0.08)
-0.105
(0.12)
0.232
(0.13)
0.283
(0.2)
-0.008
(0.49)
-0.19
(0.41)
0.696
(0.9)
1.506
(0.85)
1.229
(0.87)
0.876
(0.83)

SNC
0.344
(1.11)
0.642
(0.55)
-0.882
(0.57)
0.315
(0.44)
0.892
(1.6)
2.974*
(1.48)
-0.094
(0.15)
0.229*
(0.11)
-0.169
(0.22)
0.159
(0.2)
-0.692
(0.55)

1.425
(1.67)
1.793
(1.38)
1.373
(1.85)

Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: SNC: Symmetrical
Nonconventional. MENA: Middle East and North Africa.
Note that the covariates “New State”, “Civil War Recidivist”, and “Asia” were dropped from the model where it is
question of symmetrical nonconventional civil wars since they over-predict the negligible risk of symmetrical
nonconventional civil wars in Asian states, in, new states, and in those whereby civil war has been recurring since the
year 1900 (recidivists).
127
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The above table suggests that the findings presented in Table 4.6 are more or less consistent
with those presented above. Given that the event under study, civil war onset, is a rare event128,
rare event logistic regressions (estimated in the above table) were run in order to avoid
underestimating the probabilities of such events (King et al. 1999a; King et al. 1999b; King et al.
2001).

128

Note that they are only 126 instances of civil war onset out of a total of 7517 observations.

105

Appendix B: The Level of Violence in Civil War
Table B.1: Pattern of Deaths (KOSVED dataset)

Table B.2: Pattern of Deaths (PRIO100 dataset)

The level of overall violence committed strictly against civilians (Table B.1) and against
both civilians and combatants (Table B.2) is reflected in the two graphs above. The values of
deaths in the first graph range from 0 to 600, and from 100 to 350000 deaths in the second graph.
Note that the number of total casualties is graphed in the bottom-right corner in both outputs.
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Appendix B.3: List of Civil Wars included in KOSVED Dataset

Civil War
Angola
Azerbaijan
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Chad
Chechnya
Colombia
Côte d’Ivoire
Croatia
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Liberia
Liberia
Macedonia
Niger-Eastern
Niger- Air and Azwad
Republic of the Congo
Serbia
Slovenia
Sudan-Darfur
Uganda

Start
1994
1990
1990
2000
1993
1999
2000
1990
1995
1989
2001
1998
1994
1990
1991
1998
1991
2001
1979

End
2003
1996
1995
2004
2006
2003
2006
1996
2002
1994
2005
2001
1999
1999
2005
2001
1991
2008
2002

From the list above we count 19 instances of civil wars included in the KOSVED dataset,
of which 17 are unique cases (as opposed to the case of Liberia that is included twice in order to
temporally match the first and second Liberian civil war, respectively). From this study were
excluded the cases of Colombia (1999-2003), Niger-Eastern (1994-199), and Niger- Air and
Azwad (1990-1999) for lack of reliable and complete data. All the remaining cases are included
in the study.
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Appendix B.4: Explaining the Parameters in the Probabilities of Civil War types
Below are the likelihoods of civil war type as a function of both the actor and the weaponry.
Figure B.5. Probability that a Civil War is Fought Conventionally

Figure B.6. Probability that a Civil War is Fought Symmetrically and Unconventionally
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Figure B.7. Probability that a Civil War is fought Irregularly, Given the Function of the
Incumbent State

Figure B.8. Probability that a Civil War is Fought Irregularly, Given the Function of the
Insurgent

Below is the algebraic function of the probability that a civil war is fought in conventional,
symmetrical nonconventional, or irregular mode. Note that the below logistic function is
graphically translated above, through a four way disaggregation into the function f(x) of the
incumbent and that of the insurgent.

Also, note that since conventional and symmetrical

nonconventional warfare both imply power parity between the incumbent state and the insurgent,
they both share the same function and probabilities (Figures B.5 and B.6, respectively).
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Figure B.8: Algebraic Function of the Probability that a Type of Civil War is Fought:
𝜋𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 → (𝑃)|(𝑘):𝑓(𝑥) =

1
1 + 𝑒 −𝑥

The equation is expressed whereby the probability 𝜋 that a civil war is fought in
conventional, symmetrical nonconventional, or irregular mode for the specific warring actor at
time t is the equivalent to the probability 𝑃 given the weapon used k, which is modeled via the
inverse of the logistic function. The final value represents a probability, thus a value between 0
and 1.
Appendix B.9 Identification and Definition of Tactics at the Disposal of Warring Actors129
Tactic

Definition

Looting

Indiscriminate stealing of goods by force.

Scorched

Kidnapping

Wide-scale burning of buildings, destruction of infrastructure such as roads,
power lines, and water treatment systems, used to make an area uninhabitable.
Tactics related to starvation include the deliberate withholding of food aid,
deliberate destruction of crops, attacks on food-aid convoys, etcetera.
Using human shields involves moving non-combatants onto battlefield as
protection of the armed group, hiding in hospitals, hiding among crowds, etcetera.
Assassinations are discrete events of killing a leader of one of the involved
organized groups.
Torture is a deliberate physical act to inflict severe suffering or pain on the human body.
Taking hostages is the forceful abduction (of children or adults) until specific
demands are met or money is handed over.
Kidnapping is the forceful abduction (of children or adults) for the use as fighters.

Deport

Deportation is forced banishment of civilians from a certain area.

Disappear

Non-combatants disappear without evidence of death or abduction. This will also
occur when there are reports of additional victims who cannot be accounted for among the
known dead.
A guarded enclosure for the detention or imprisonment of political prisoners,
prisoners
or
war,
aliens,
refugees.

Starvation
Shields
Assassination
Torture
Hostage

Camps

Sieges

129

Situations where the freedom of movement of non-combatants is restricted to a limited
geographical area, but where the targeted individuals and groups were not forcefully
transported to these locations. Usually the inhabitants maintain internal control of the area to
which they are restricted because of the siege.

Directly borrowed from the codebook attached to the KOSVED dataset (Bussman and Schneider 2012).
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Appendix B.10: The Probability that a Civil War is Fought Irregularly Given the Actor and the
Tactic
Figure B.11. Probability that a Civil War is Fought Irregularly Given the Function of the Actor
(Incumbent) and the Tactic130

130

It is suggested to read the scale on the x-axis as going from left to right (in the area within the two left quadrants)
and then from right to left (in the area of the two right quadrants). This reading allows for an explanation of the increase
in the probability (going from the left to the middle part of the graph) and a subsequent decrease in the latter (going
from the right to the middle part of the graph) even though the scale on the x-axis, in reality, has a univocal direction
from left to right.
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Figures B.12. Probability that a Civil War is Fought Irregularly Given the Function of the Actor
(Insurgent) and the Tactic

The above two figures assume that both the incumbent state and the insurgent are using
similar weaponry. What decisively codes the civil war as irregular becomes a function of the tactics
used. In fact, the determinant of irregular civil war (in the above illustration) is when the incumbent
besieges an area, or reciprocally when the insurgent, forced to flee, has recourse to scorched earth
tactics131. Whenever the insurgent besieges an area, it is argued that the probability of fighting an
irregular civil war is substantially reduced, as the balance of power between the incumbent and the
insurgent is restored. The type of war becomes either conventional or symmetrical
nonconventional, depending on the type of armaments the rival actors deploy (heavy or light
weaponry).

131

Note that the incumbent siege propels the probability of irregular civil war from random to decisive, equally,
whenever the incumbent state has recourse to scorched earth tactics, it is implied that the power asymmetry between
the latter and the insurgent is reduced. As a result, the probability of fighting an irregular civil war substantially
decreases. Other tactics can interchangeably explain the same phenomenon: torture versus kidnapping, target
assassination versus human shields, and so forth. The two tactics in the output were randomly chosen. Only those two
tactics were considered in order to preserve the clarity of the graphical output and to avoid reproducing multiple graphs
that would illustrate the same exact logic.
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Appendix C: Consolidation Against Civil War
Appendix C.1: Missing Cases
41 subjects were dropped from the study because of missing data or because they represent
micro-sates with less than 500, 0000 inhabitants (The World fact book, CIA 2008). Below is the
exhaustive alphabetical enumeration of such observations:
Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia, Brunei, Cape Verde,
Comoros, Cyprus, Dominica, East Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji,
Guinea, Grenada, Guyana, Iceland, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands
Monaco, Nauru, Oman, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tomé-et-Principe, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, Serbia, Tonga,
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
Appendix C.2: Change-Point Diagnostics
In the following outputs, the two graphs on the left-hand side and the one in the bottomright corner provide three diagnostics, trace, autocorrelation and density, to the histogram of civil
war count, which is always found in the top-right corner. Note that the legend in the density plot
describes the overall values of the density-labeled as “All”- the values that mu1 can have- labeled
as “1-half”- and those that mu2 can have-labeled as “2-half”132. Also note that for purposes of
graphical clarity, the temporal range is the same on the x-axis, which goes from 1820 to 2007. The
models that were graphed dismiss episodes of no substantial change in the frequency of civil war
that occurred before and after the cp value. Consequently, the graphical output focuses on
capturing the specific point in time within which the cp value was computed. Evidently, each cp
value for each set of models is different, which translates into different start and end years on the
x-axis throughout every one of the seven diagnostics drawn. Trace refers to the notion of discerning
whether one unique time value is essentially driving or influencing each iteration run until
convergence is reached. All seven models show that trace is not problematic, since they are no
132

Also note that the legend in model five was purposely removed as it partially overlapped with the graph.
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clear time values that influence the number of iterations to converge at a concentrated region of
years133. Autocorrelation looks at time-dependency, or more precisely assesses whether a past
value is determining current distribution of data points. Overall, autocorrelation is either zero
(models 1 and 3) or around 20% after 40 lags, which is not indicative of high time-dependency in
the data. Moreover, the values of mu1 and mu2, graphed in the density plot should ideally match
or spatially overlap. This is almost the case for all seven models except for the results generated
in Table 6.5 (low per capita GDP). Given that the credible intervals of mu1 and mu2 are by far the
most disparate or the widest out of the seven models, the density plot in model 5 shows a relative
mismatch in the values of mu1 and mu2 plotted across time. Below are the diagnostics per model.
Figure C.3: Change-point diagnostics for aggregate cases (See Table 6.1)

133

In other words, the region of the trace plot follows a quasi-monotonous horizontal linear form, which is indicative
of an unbiased iterative process that is not conditioned or influenced by a specific year or range of years.
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Note that figure O.1 features three visible peaks in the frequency of civil war, at an
aggregated level regarding all states between 1820 and 2007. Out of all three peaks, the most
pronounced is in 1959-1960. The change point value is 1959. The conclusion made and mentioned
earlier is that the world, since 1959-1960, has become more civil war-prone as the value of mu2 is
greater than the one of mu1.
Figure C.4: Change-point diagnostics for states with high democratic propensities (See Table
6.2)

In figure C.3 above, one can see that the number of civil wars fought noticeably peaks
around 1943 in states that have more often than not been democratic. However, interestingly,
relative to Figure C.2, the civil wars that were fought in the early 1960s appear to not have included
states with high democratic propensity. However, the results of Table 6.2 confirm that the
democratic quality of nations does not contribute to their respective efforts to consolidate against
civil wars, as the value of mu1 is smaller than that of mu2.

115

Figure C.5: Change-point diagnostics for states with high autocratic propensities (See Table
6.3)

Conversely, looking at Figure C.2, one can deduce that the civil wars of the early1960s
were fought in states with low democratic propensity, or ones with a high autocratic leaning.
Likewise, the results are equally unambiguous, in that they demonstrate that not being democratic
only going to increase the odds of undergoing civil war, especially since the early 1960s onward.
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Figure C.6. Change-point diagnostics for states with high per capita GDP levels (See Table 6.4)

The results in Figure C.6 can arguably be considered the most convincing. Except from a
minor bump the late 1940s, states that have enjoyed high per capita GDP levels have decisively
moved toward consolidation since the early 1930s onward. Note also that those same states appear
to have been immune to the overarching wave of civil wars that took shape in the early 1960s. This
observation provides another piece of evidence to support the theoretical expectation; namely that
the wealth of nations greatly encourages them to consolidate against civil wars.
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Figure C.7: Change-point diagnostics for states with low per capita GDP levels (See Table 6.5)

On the other hand, the results of the cp value in low-income states, which is year 1971,
provide ambiguous interpretations as to the direction of those states in their respective efforts to
move toward consolidation against civil war. In fact, the decade 1940s witnesses an overall
decrease in civil war count in low-income states, the decades 1950s and 1960s hint to a stagnation
in the count of civil wars. Starting in 1971, the number of civil war counts starts decisively
increasing. This observation, itself derived from the results run, helps to confirm hypothesis
eleven, namely that low-income states fail to consolidation or even fail to move toward
consolidation against civil war134.

134

Also given that the ratio {mu1/mu2} is over 1, the trend is thus indicative of an overall rise in the number of civil
wars fought since the early 1970s and in states with low levels of per capita GDP.
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Figure C.8: Change-point diagnostics for states with high levels of economic growth (See Table
6.6)

The results regarding states that experience high levels of economic growth hint to an
overall increase in the number of civil wars starting in the beginning of the 20th century. A decisive
decrease in that number was noted in 1948 (the cp value) onward. Before stagnating, that number
appears to have increased in the late 1980s. Also, given that the ration {mu1/mu2} is over 1, one
can say with confidence that economies experiencing a robust and sustainably high economic
growth levels do not necessarily move toward consolidation against civil war, which puts the first
part of hypothesis twelve in doubt.
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Figure C.9: Change-point diagnostics for states with low levels of economic growth (See Model
6.7)

Finally, because of relative volatility in the pattern of variation in the number of civil wars
fought in states experiencing low levels of economic growth, the second part of hypothesis twelve
is confirmed. Put otherwise, states that face low levels of economic growth do not move toward
consolidation, but rather further away from it. In fact, not only do states will low economic growth
experience an increase of civil wars by factor of almost 11 before and after 1957 (the cp value),
but the two subsequent less pronounced peaks in 1959 and 1963 suggest that states with stressed
levels of economic growth are clearly more exposed to civil war as time passes, at least since the
year 1957.
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Appendix C.10 Interval Hypothesis Testing: Sensitivity Analysis
The purpose of the following diagnostics is to identify which years, relative to others, have
been most prevalent in determining the posterior likelihood that the change-point value will fall
within a given range or interval of years. Since the respective change-point values are at the heart
of the analysis in Chapter 6, it is useful to discern how likely the change point value is correctly
specified in the models. The following diagnostics allow for such discernment. Note that the
threshold of accepted probability that the change-point value falls within a specific interval of
years is equal to or greater than 0.95. Thus, the higher the probability, the more assertive becomes
the claim that states have experienced a significant change in pattern before and after the given
change-point value.
Appendix C.11: Aggregate cases of Civil Wars Fought
1) Interval tests

MCMC sample size =

10,000

Prob1: 1955 < {cp} < 1962

Prob1

Mean
.8429

Std. Dev.
0.36391

2) Interval tests

MCSE
.009872

MCMC sample size =

10,000

Prob1: 1955 < {cp} < 1963

Prob1

Mean
.9757

Std. Dev.
0.15399

MCSE
.003298

In the first table above, one can see that the mean probability that the change-point value
falls within the range [1955; 1962] is 0.8429. On the other hand, accounting for the year 1963 (in
table 2) increases the probability that the true change-point value occurred somewhere between
1955 and 1963 to 0.9757. Thus, the year 1963 has decisively made states more civil war-prone,
relative to before that year.
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Appendix C.12: History of Democratic Propensity
1) Interval tests

MCMC sample size =

10,000

Prob1: 1934 < {cp} < 1951

Prob1

Mean Std. Dev.
MCSE
.9422 0.23338
.0086601

2) Interval tests

MCMC sample size =

10,000

Prob1: 1933 < {cp} < 1951

Prob1

Mean
.9513

Std. Dev.
0.21588

MCSE
.0079189

In the first table above, one can see that the mean probability that the change-point value
falls within the range [1934; 1951] is 0.9422. However, accounting for year 1933 increases the
probability (albeit not substantially) to reach 0.9513. Thus, the year 1933 is an important year to
account for when considering the failure of states with high democratic propensity to consolidate
decisively against civil wars.
Appendix C.13: History of Autocratic Propensity
1) Interval tests

MCMC sample size =

10,000

Prob1: 1958 < {cp} < 1963

Prob1

Mean Std. Dev.
MCSE
.9298 0.25550
.0081796

2) Interval tests

MCMC sample size =

10,000

Prob1: 1957 < {cp} < 1963

Prob1

Mean
.9543

Std. Dev.
MCSE
0.20884 .0070061

In the first table above, one can see that the mean probability that the change-point value
falls within the range [1958; 1963] is 0.9298. However, accounting for year 1957 increases the
probability (albeit not substantially) to reach 0.9543. Thus, the year 1957 is an important year to
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account for when considering the failure of states with high autocratic propensity to consolidate
decisively against civil wars.
Appendix C.14: High Level of Wealth
1) Interval tests

MCMC sample size =

10,000

Prob1: 1930 < {cp} < 1937

Prob1

Mean
.5855

2) Interval tests

Std. Dev.
0.49266

MCSE
.0225124

MCMC sample size =

10,000

Prob1: 1929 < {cp} < 1937

Prob1

Mean
.9711

Std. Dev.
0.16753

MCSE
.0128809

In the first table above, one can see that the mean probability that the change-point value
falls within the range [1930; 1937] is 0.5855. However, accounting for year 1929 increases the
probability (substantially) to reach 0.9711. Thus, the year 1929 is a highly important year to
account for when considering the success of wealthy states to consolidate decisively against civil
wars.
Appendix C.15: Low Level of Wealth
1) Interval tests

MCMC sample size =

10,000

Prob1: 1933 < {cp} < 2006

Prob1

Mean
.9416

2) Interval tests

Std. Dev.
MCSE
0.23451 .0185362

MCMC sample size =

10,000

Prob1: 1932 < {cp} < 2006

Prob1

Mean
.9678

Std. Dev.
0.17654

MCSE
.0100491
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In the first table above, one can see that the mean probability that the change-point value
falls within the range [1933; 2006] is 0.9416. However, accounting for year 1932 increases the
probability (albeit not substantially) to reach 0.9678. Thus, the year 1932 should be accounted for
when considering the relatively weak success of poor states at consolidating against civil wars.
Given the wide intervals of years, one cannot deduce strong and decisive conclusions about the
impact of low per capita GDP on the respective efforts of states to consolidate or to move toward
consolidation against civil wars.
Appendix C.16: High Level of Economic Growth
1) Interval tests

MCMC sample size =

.

10,000

Prob1: 1903 < {cp} < 2005

Prob1

Mean
.9392

Std. Dev.
0.23898

MCSE
.010004

2) Interval tests MCMC sample size =
Prob1 : 1903 < {cp} < 2006

Prob1

Mean
.9503

Std. Dev.
0.21734

10,000

MCSE
009259

Equally large are the credible intervals within which the change-point value situates itself
when it comes to states with high levels of economic growth. Albeit not substantial, the change in
probability reaches a conventional threshold of significance at the .05 level after accounting for
the year 2006. This shows that the trend of decrease is in the overall number of civil wars fought
in states with high levels of economic growth is a relatively recent trend. Assuming that this pattern
remains unchanged, the decrease in the count of civil wars fought in states with high levels of
economic growth should persevere. Thus, the results do not contradict the theoretical expectations,
which predict an overall notable effort of states with high levels of economic growth to move
toward consolidation against civil war.
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Appendix C.17: Low Level of Economic Growth
1) Interval tests

MCMC sample size =

10,000

Prob1: 1946 < {cp} < 1962

Prob1

Mean Std. Dev.
MCSE
. 8689 0.33753 .0125481

2) Interval tests

MCMC sample size =

10,000

Prob1: 1946 < {cp} < 1963
Mean
Prob1

.9798

Std. Dev.

0.14069

MCSE

.0060373

The results in the final interval hypothesis testing appear to be much more conclusive than
the ones in model six. In fact, one can argue that the range or interval [1946; 1962] includes the
change-point value with approximately 87% probability. However, broadening that range to
include the year 1963 strongly contributes to the overall increase of the probability that the changepoint value, in fact, lies within the interval [1946; 1963]. Thus, there is an almost 98% chance that
the change-point value, accurately identifies a decisive increase over time since the late 1950s in
the number of civil wars fought in states experiencing economic recession within the temporal
interval [1946; 1963].
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Appendix D: Tables of Summary Statistics
Table D.1. Summary Statistics of the Data in Chapter Four
Variable
Mean
Civil War Type
.029357
Democratic Propensity .4656176
Incumbent Consolidation .036707
Militarized Executive
.2454232
Per Capita GDP
7.9614
Yearly GDP Growth
10.26702
Rough Terrain
2.149859
Rural Population
8.918441
Ethnic frac.
.3864273
Religious frac.
.3645131
Polity (Times -1)
-.2572493
Polity*Ethnic Frac.
.2212062
Polity*Rel. Frac
-.1355299
New state
.1422904
Civil War Recidivist
.2396191
Sub-Saharan Africa
.2447765
MENA
.1370008
Latin America
.1416292
Asia
.1801111

Std. Dev.
.2421858
.4988494
.188054
.4303664
1.062553
1.847241
1.413818
1.412263
.2860239
.2187835
7.491332
3.292165
3.196506
.3493708
.4268793
.429983
.3438709
.3486925
.3843054

Min
1
0
0
0
5.31524
5.552971
0
1.94591
0.0012999
0
-10
-8.864782
-7.782
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
3
1
1
1
10.35321
16.06524
4.421247
13.82323
0.9250348
0.7828
10
8.114686
6.4
1
1
1
1
1
1

Table D.2. Summary Statistics of the Data in Chapter Five (PRIO100 Dataset)
Variable s
Total Deaths
Civil War Type
Polity Scores
Per capita GDP
GDP growth
Ethnic Frac.
Religious Frac.
Elevation
Population
Sub-Saharan Africa

Mean
7295.286
1.892818
1.087151
7.46063
10.7036
.5558433
.3770696
2.621221
10.1607
.2530387

Std. Dev.
26965.23
.3858724
6.583418
.8970753
2.059087
.2826501
.1944438
1.1167
1.823875
.4349933

Min
100
1
-10
5.330478
5.912106
.0355107
0
0
5.927531
0

Max
350000
3
10
9.794602
15.04374
.9016318
.7828
4.421247
13.95353
1

Table D.3. Summary Statistics of the Data in Chapter Five (KOSVED Dataset)
Variable s
Total Deaths
Civil War Type
Polity Scores
Per capita GDP
GDP growth
Ethnic Frac.
Religious Frac.
Elevation
Population
Sub-Saharan Africa
Duration

Mean
6.871514
2.044474
-1.194136
7.077041
9.77823
.6790427
.5242861
3.079594
9.607647
.6233675
347.6053

Std. Dev.
32.57928
.5940919
2.605892
.9357995
1.075958
.1925149
.1959896
.5860994
1.11247
.484627
140.6521
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Min
0
1
-7
5.330478
7.580189
.3035241
.1334
0
7.505139
0
22

Max
600
3
6
8.902535
13.85735
9016318
.7242
4.182472
11.90827
1
461

Table D.4. Summary Statistics of the Data in Chapter Six-Full Model
Variable
Year
Civil War Count

Mean
1913.5
1.308511

Std. Dev.
54.41507
1.571991

Min
1820
0

Max
2007
10

Table D.5. Summary Statistics of the Data in Chapter Six- Democratic Propensity
Variable
Year
Civil War Count

Mean
1913.5
.2925532

Std. Dev.
54.41507
.6329186

Min
1820
0

Max
2007
4

Table D.6. Summary Statistics of the Data in Chapter Six- Autocratic Propensity
Variable
Year
Civil War Count

Mean
1913.5
1.026596

Std. Dev.
54.41507
1.276834

Min
1820
0

Max
2007
8

Table D.7. Summary Statistics of the Data in Chapter Six- Wealthy States
Variable
Year
Civil War Count

Mean
1913.5
.3617021

Std. Dev.
54.41507
.6678413

Min
1820
0

Max
2007
3

Table D.8. Summary Statistics of the Data in Chapter Six- Poor States
Variable
Year
Civil War Count

Mean
1913.5
.5585106

Std. Dev.
54.41507
.7470311

Min
1820
0

Max
2007
3

Table D.9. Summary Statistics of the Data in Chapter Six - High Economic Growth
Variable
Year
Civil War Count

Mean
1913.5
.5531915

Std. Dev.
54.41507
.7474308

Min
1820
0

Max
2007
3

Table D.10. Summary Statistics of the Data in Chapter Six -Low Economic Growth
Variable
Year
Civil War Count

Mean
1913.5
1.136206

Std. Dev.
54.41507
1.790831
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Min
1820
0

Max
2007
6
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